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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Communications and Cybersecurity 
at the International Hellenic University. 
More specifically, this paper critically examines the implementation of Network and 
Information Systems Directive (NISD) by the identified operators of essential services 
(OESs) of the Critical Infrastructure (CI) sectors (public and private) and certain digital 
service providers (DSPs) for all Members in the European Union.  
To introduce the unfamiliar reader to cybersecurity conception, this thesis provides an 
analytic description of the general provisions of the NISD alongside the proposed secu-
rity measures for all Member States. 
Following, it examines the way Greece has transposed the context of the directive into 
national laws and analyzes in detail its effectiveness, providing some conclusions about 
it.  
Subsequently, the thesis tries to reach some general conclusions about the context of the 
NISD, by understanding its significance since it must be regarded as a national priority 
among Member States. 
Finally, this paper studies the implementation of the NISD into Greek aviation industry 
making a recommendation for the air transport sector to set up an aviation cybersecurity 
strategy. 
It is also worth stating that the findings for this thesis were drawn from the literature, 
and empirical studies in Cybersecurity area. 
My deepest thanks and gratitude go to my respected supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. 
Komninos G. Komnios. His patient and gentle guidance alongside the encouragement 
and advice has contributed immensely towards the fulfillment of this thesis by helping 
me to overcome my concerns and see new, interesting aspects of this work in my work-
ing environment.  
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couragement and colleagues for the provision of significant information and assistance. 
Special thanks go to my dearest Yvonne for her continuous assistance to my family and 
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1 Cybersecurity in Europe 
1.1 Introduction 
In modern times, everyday human activities include the extended use of a networked 
computer environment, creating “virtual communities" with no social, territory and cul-
tural borders, by providing them with a two-way direct communication, and making 
them feel more and more as a global citizen. 
 Terms such as ‘information’, ‘cyber’ and ‘digital’ are commonly used in everyday dis-
cussions1, creating new vocabulary such as ‘information system’, ‘cyberspace’, 
‘cybersecurity’, ‘digital information’, ‘digital market’ etc2. 
Although there is no precise definition of these terms, they have been used extensively 
in daily routine which signal that we all are citizens of the so-called ‘information age’. 
According to the literature, the key characteristics of this era3 are: 
1. The widespread use of technology in the economic and social framework activi-
ty of individuals and nations; 
2. The heavy dependency of the society on this technology. 
Indeed, the use of computers is not any more limited to support the operation of the in-
dustrial production, e.g. the use of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)4 
solutions in many modern industries, like energy, manufacturing, water transportation, 
etc. nor to support the business management in general, by providing a group of ser-
vices such as, project management, support and database services, and other more. In-
stead of that, the constant development of more advanced ICT5 products, in combina-
tion with their low cost and ease of use, contributes to the establishment of the infor-
mation revolution phenomenon; the interoperability offered through the “marriage of 
                                                 
1 In the press, political speeches, popular books, scholarly journals, and everyday conversations. 
2Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US efforts to secure the information age, p. 
14, New York 2008 
3Myriam Dunn, Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel and Victor Mauer, Power and Security in the Information 
Age, 2007, pp. 19-28. 
4 SCADA systems organize multiple technologies that allows to process, gather and monitor data at the 
same time to send instructions to those points that transmit data. 
5 Information communication technology. 
-2- 
computers, telecommunications and the worldwide assembly of systems6, has made 
electronic information widely available”7 in the provision of the essential everyday ser-
vices.  
1.2 The power of information 
Since we live in the digital era the dominant power that features our world is the infor-
mation; “Where once economies were built on industry and conquest, we are now part 
of a global information economy”8.  
The term information security includes not only the protection of data that flows 
through the interconnected information systems but also the physical existence of the 
information systems components. 
An information system (IS) therefore, is a combination of software, hardware utilities 
and networks created by people. These people use an IS, by following specific proce-
dures, aiming to collect, create, store and distribute useful information resources (data) 
in an organization9. Picture 1 shows the components of an information system. 
  
Picture 1: The components of an information system. 
 
 The benefits we may enjoy due to the extended growth of ICT products may also pro-
voke serious concern on the appearance of emerging and sophisticated threats, challeng-
ing the proper operation of information systems and therefore the social stability in 
terms of prosperity and peace within nations.  
                                                 
6 Databases, and telecommunications networks. 
7Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US efforts to secure the information age, p. 
19, New York 2008 
8Frank Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 2006.   
9Joseph Valacich, Christoph Schneider, Information Systems Today: Managing in the Digital World, 
2016. 
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 The protection of an information system should concern the adoption of appropriate 
security measures for each of the above components10 individually, taking into serious 
consideration the existing interoperability, due to their interconnected nature.  
Each of the components may be vulnerable to a different type of threat11.  
For example, according to a  recent study of the European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (ENISA), the new cyber-challenges landscape includes the 
following top types of threats: malware, phishing, web-based attacks, web-application 
attacks, spam, Denial-of-Service (DoS), ransomware, botnets, insider threats, physical 
manipulation/damage/theft/loss, data breaches, identity theft, information leakage, ex-
ploit kits and cyber espionage. As we may observe this frequent alternation of the cyber 
threat landscape entails also the identification of new types of threat agents12 such as 
Cyber-criminals, Hacktivists, Cyber-fighters, Cyber-terrorists, script kiddies etc. 
Table 1 presents the involvement of the above threat agents in the deployment of the 
identified top cyber-threats13. 
Table 1: Involvement of threat agents in the top cyber-threats. 
 
                                                 
10 Software, hardware, people, networks, data and procedures. 
11 Relative studies have been conducted for providing information about the types of threats, the actors 
involved, the techniques used for and the frequency the environment changes, testifying the rapid change 
in the threat landscape in cyberspace. 
12 Malicious actors. 
13ENISA, Threat Landscape Report 2017, 15 Top Cyber-Threats and Trends, p. 98, available at:  
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2017 
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In the past, the traditional network security measures applied for resisting and respond-
ing to cyber-attacks, such as firewalls VPNs, INTRANETs, Access control systems etc., 
were nothing more than a fragmented approach, lacked in flexibility and interoperabil-
ity. More specifically, the security of an information system was regarded as an IT de-
partment’s concern for implementing hardware and software security solutions during 
the implementation process of an installation, but most of the times, after the occurrence 
of a significant incident. 
The implementation for example, of a ‘commercial off the shelf’ (COT) product, does 
not anymore seem to be appropriate for every system. On the contrary, the serious con-
cern should be based on determining the regulatory, statutory and policy constraints on 
business systems before applying them14.  
So, a new conception of information system security requires everybody to take into 
serious consideration the interdependences and interoperability between various imple-
mented products within different information systems, in order to quickly see any 
change in the expected systems’ operational behaviour.  
 These changes may be caused either from offensive or defensive activities. 
                                                 
14Michele Motsko, Patricia Oberndorf, Ellen-Jane Pairo, James Smith, Rules of Thumb for the Use of 
COTS Products, 2002. 
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While Offensive activities refer to malicious activities from cyber terrorists and cyber-
rime area, defensive activities refer to the protection of Critical Information Infrastruc-
ture (CII). More specifically to the protection of CII, the interruption of their essential 
services to the society may not only be caused by physical threats such as natural disas-
ters, but it may also be provoked by malicious human acts of terrorist and criminal ac-
tivities taking advantages of the existing vulnerabilities of the implemented information 
systems and networks within the organizations.  
Therefore, the insecure communication environment of internet although cannot be easi-
ly governed, in terms of addressing effectively criminal activities, it is necessary for a 
common rule to be established at national level, within the European Union (EU), for 
addressing all possible threats that may have a negative impact on the security of the EU 
and the well-being of its citizens. 
1.3 The initial cybersecurity approach in Europe 
European Union operates as a single European market that meets no borders in facilitat-
ing the free movement of persons, goods, services and capitals. However, the heavily 
dependent activities of people on the internet and the related computer networks, 
provide them with a borderless flexibility and directness in their daily activities. 
This means that European citizens do face offensive activities, that cannot be tackled 
effectively due to different national legislation. 
Although there has been some progress on a national level, the emerging increased level 
of cyber threats, in combination with the overall societal impact, is not entirely satisfac-
tory, due to: 
1. The asymmetry in growth between the changing threat landscape and the ad-
vance in the development of ICT products;  
2. The differences in building national capabilities for resisting to cybersecurity 
challenges; and   
3. The European fragmented approach on dealing with cybersecurity issues, by 
establishing a series of legal and regulatory instruments, that overlap rather than 
adopting an overarching framework15. 
                                                 
15
George Christou, Cyber security in the European Union: Resilience and Adaptability in Governance 
Policy, 2016, pp. 119-131. 
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For example, Germany, in 2015 adopted legislation (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz16) for regulat-
ing the cybersecurity challenges in German corporations into the telecommunication 
sector, by defining a minimal set of security measures. Similar actions were taken by 
France since 2009, that has established the National Network and Information Security 
Agency (ANSSI) in charge of cybersecurity in the country, and from 2008 till 2013, has 
already published three high-level policy documents relevant to cyberspace activities17. 
1.3.1 The convention of Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) 
In 1997, a group of experts on cybercrime was designated by the Council of Europe, 
with the objective to create a common criminal policy on fighting cybercrimes, while 
promoting a strong and progressive international co-operation for the provision of elec-
tronic evidence. 
More specifically, they were focused on the identification of new threats aiming to de-
fine new types of cybercrimes and establishing of jurisdictional rights and criminal lia-
bilities, for enhancing the international cooperation in information sharing processes.  
The result of this first international treaty, on addressing cyber-crimes through the inter-
net and the use of computer networks, was the Convention of Budapest Treaty No.185, 
in 200118, and constitutes the first binding international instrument on cybercrime. 
The main concerns of this treaty were the infringement of intellectual property, the 
computer-related fraud, child pornography and generally the attacks on computer net-
works.  
In terms of this international agreement, the European Commission (EC), in 2001, is-
sued a Communication on Network and Information Security (NIS)19, underpinning the 
significance of Network and Information Systems alongside with its increasing concern 
on cyber threats. Later, in 2006, the above communication was adopted in the Strategy 
for a Secure Information Society20. 
                                                 
16 Available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/040/1804096.pdf   
17 Such as: a) “White Paper on National Defense and Security of 2008”; b) “France’s Cyber Strategy 
2011”; and c) “White Paper on National Defense and Security of 2013”.  
18Also known as the convention on cyber crimes, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_buda
pest_en.pdf. 
19 Proposal for A European Policy Approach (COM (2001) final, available at: 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/EU-010606-NISProposal.pdf 
20 A strategy for a Secure Information Society – “Dialogue, partnership and empowerment” COM (2006), 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/doc/com2006251.pdf 
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Unfortunately, the content of this treaty remained largely a symbolic policy21 at a global 
level, with a limited impact on counterfeiting effectively the cybercrime in the long 
term, because of inconsistencies in terms of laws and resources among different na-
tions22 23. 
1.3.2 The establishment of ENISA 
In the meantime, the awareness of the lack of an institutional body, responsible for de-
veloping co-operation, coordination and research in the field of the information security 
and networks within EU, led to the establishment of ENISA, in 2004. (More about 
ENISA in paragraph 1.5) 
1.3.3 The Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
Subsequently, in 2009, the Commission adopted a Communication on Critical Infor-
mation Infrastructure Protection (CIIP)24 regarding the continuity of their essential ser-
vices. The enhanced approach by the Commission was the introduction of framework 
activities focusing on preventing and responding to cybersecurity risks. 
On the 27th of May in 2011, the European Council communicated its conclusions on 
CIIP highlighting the requirement for ICT systems and networks to develop appropriate 
and proportionate security measures against all possible disturbances25.  
 
 
                                                 
21 This term is used for describing the policies that have no actual or significant change rather than mak-
ing the public feel that something will be done. (Edelman, 1964). Nancy E. Marion, The Council of Eu-
rope’s Cyber Crime Treaty: An exercise in Symbolic Legislation, 2010.  
22Grabosky Peter, Electronic Crime. Upper Saddle River, 2007. 
23 Till today 67 States have signed this agreement, together with nine international organizations apart 
from EU to participate either as members or observers, available at: 
https://www.thegfce.com/news/news/2016/12/07/budapest-convention-on-cybercrime. 
24 Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security and 
resilience, COM(2009)149, available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0149:FIN:EN:PDF 
25 Many of the recommendations of the Council have been considered in the cyber security strategy pub-
lished in 2013 and with the proposal for a Directive on network and information security. Council conclu-
sions on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection-Achievements and next steps: towards global cy-
bersecurity, 2011, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede150611cccybersecurity_/se
de150611cccybersecurity_en.pdf 
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1.3.4 The Digital Agenda for Europe  
In 2010, the Commission communicated the digital agenda for Europe26 explaining how 
the European citizens and businesses may be benefitted from digital technologies and 
underpinned the necessity for setting the trust and security as the fundamental 
precondition, in order to create a digital single market beneficial for all the European 
businesses. 
 
1.4 The EU recent cybersecurity approach 
So far, we may object that the European Commission had selected an approach to ensur-
ing the protection of its citizens while performing online activities. However, from 2013 
till today, the Commission enhanced its cybersecurity approach by focusing more on the 
following key objectives27: 
i. Increasing cybersecurity capabilities and cooperation; 
ii. Making the EU a strong player in cybersecurity; 
iii. Mainstreaming cybersecurity in EU policies. 
The selection by the EU action plan for strengthening its resilience to cybersecurity 
risks is simultaneously driven in 5 axes: 
1. EU strategies; 
2. EU legislation; 
3. Networks and organizations28; 
4. EU funding29; and, 
5. International activities30. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PD 
27 EC, EU cyber security initiatives –working towards a more secure online environment, January 2017, 
p. 2, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-
3/factsheet_cybersecurity_update_january_2017_41543.pdf 
28 Such as: ENISA, CERT –EU, EC3. 
29 Such as the 7th Framework Programme and The Horizon 2020. 
30 Relative activities performed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission in 
cooperation with Member States. 
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1.4.1 EU strategies 
a. The EU cyber security Strategy 
In this strategy (in 2013) it is outlined the EU's vision on promoting a secure cyberspace 
by introducing the appropriate action plan required for deterring the cybercrime31.  
The proposed action plan covers five priorities32: 
1. The building on a more cyber resilient environment; 
2. The extremely reduce of cybercrime; 
3. The development of an EU cyber defence policy; 
4. The development of industrial and technological resources relative to cyber 
protection; 
5. The establishment of a coherent international cyberspace policy within the 
EU and promote core EU values. 
 
In picture 2 are illustrated the central pillars of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy. 
 
Picture 2: The central pillars of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy33. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013) 1. 
 
32EC, EU cyber security initiatives –working towards a more secure online environment, January 2017, p. 
2. 
33 Christou George, Cyber security in the European Union: Resilience and Adaptability in Governance 
Policy, p. 3, 2016. 
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b. European Agenda on Security (2015) 
This strategy sets the fighting of the cybercrime as a priority, for the period 2015-2020, 
by proposing specific actions on reviewing the existing framework34. 
1.4.2 EC Communications 
Communication on Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Foster-
ing a Competitive and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry35 (2016) 
This communication includes measures for: 
 Improving cooperation within Europe, by encouraging the Member 
States to adopt the cooperation mechanisms underlined by the NIS Di-
rective for being capable of handling large-scale cyber incidents; 
 Supporting for creating a certification scheme for the security of the ICT 
products and services in the EU; and, 
 Establishing a contractual public-private partnership (PPP) with industry, 
to promote cybersecurity industrial sharing experience and innovation in 
the EU. 
1.4.3 The need for a common EU Legislation 
The EU realizing that different legislation approaches taken by countries, for han-
dling the cybersecurity challenges harden their effective handling at international level, 
adopted a series of relevant Directives for achieving an EU coherent approach, such as: 
 In 2013 – The Directive 2013/40/EU36 for attacks against information sys-
tems, replacing the Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA. 
 In 2014 – The Directive 2014/65/EU37 on markets in financial instruments 
and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU. 
                                                 
34 Replaces the previous Internal Security Strategy: The European Agenda on Security COM (2015)185 
(2010-2014), and Prioritizes terrorism, organized crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong 
cross-border dimension. Available at 
https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/european-agenda-security.pdf 
35Communication on Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and 
Innovative Cybersecurity Industry COM (2016) 410.  
36 The Directive 2013/40/EU, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32013L0040 
37 The Directive 2014/65/EU, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0065. 
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 In 2015– The Directive (EU)2015/236638 on payment services in the internal 
market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC. 
 In 2016 – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)39 replacing the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
 In 2016 – The NIS Directive40 concerning measures for a high common level 
of security of network and information systems across the Union 
1.4.4 NETWORKS / ORGANISATIONS 
In order to achieve a better coordination between different Member States in the 
handling of significant cyber-related incidents with facing no border limits, the EU 
parliament decided on establishing apart from ENISA additional key agencies, such 
as: 
  EU Computer Emergency Response Team41 (CERT-EU): a group of security 
experts was created in 2012 with the responsibility to share information between 
EU institutions, agencies and bodies for responding to security incidents and 
cyber threats.  
 Europol’s Cybercrime Centre42 (EC3): it was set up in 2013 serving as a focal 
point in fighting and handling any cybercrimes with cross-border implications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The Directive (EU)2015/2366, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L2366. 
39GDPR, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679 
40 The NIS Directive, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC&uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG 
41 CERT-EU, available at: https://cert.europa.eu/cert/plainedition/en/cert_about.html 
42EC3, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3 
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1.5 ENISA and NIS Directive 
ENISA is the European Union Agency for network and information systems security, 
the named centre of network and information systems experts for the Member States, 
the private sector and the citizens in European Union, with a shared vision of providing 
networks and information systems security on a high common level.   
1.5.1 Background and objectives 
The European Network and Information Systems Agency were originally founded by 
the European Parliament and the Council on 10/3/2004 in accordance with the Regula-
tion (EC) No 460/2004, to function as a point of contact of information exchange be-
tween stakeholders enhancing the cooperation in parallel. In the meantime, its mandate 
has been extended43 two times (Regulation (EC) No 1007/2008 on 24/09/2008 and 
Regulation 580/2011, on 8/6/2011) establishing the European Network and Information 
Systems Agency as regards its duration and reviewed once with the latest changes im-
plemented with Regulation (EU) No 526/201344 which contains the valid provisions of 
ENISA. Recently, its role has been upgraded recently, under the Digital Agenda 2020 
for Europe 2020, "Trust and Security"45. The Agency is located in Greece with the ad-
ministrative seat in Heraklion on Crete and the core operations in Athens. 
ENISA’s action framework aims mainly to prevent cyber-attacks from network and in-
formation systems and in a case where it does happen, to respond and finally address 
them in an effective and without undue delayed manner. 
 According to its strategy,46 five areas of activities are identified: 
                                                 
43 EC, Evaluation in the Commission Reporting on Results Annual Evaluation Review 2006 Conclusions 
and findings from evaluations in the Commission, 2006, page 150. This is the first evaluation of ENISA) 
reported that the operational staff was probably below the critical mass needed for effectiveness. The 
Commission included in its 2007 proposal for review of the telecoms packages a plan to establish a new 
European authority (European Electronic Communication Market Authority (EECMA)) to serve as its 
main advisor on all European regulatory affairs by taking over ENISA’s functions. However, this pro-
posal was rejected by both the Council and Parliament. In 2008, the Council and Parliament adopted the 
Commission’s proposal to extend ENISA’s mandate for another 3 years (until 2012) without any changes 
to its tasks or set-up 
44 The new mandate was extended for a period of seven years, until 2020. 
45 COM (2018) 630, 2018/0328 (COD): The Commission conducted an evaluation of the Agency by 20 
June, 2018 and proposed to modify its mandate into a permanent EU agency for cyber security. In Sep-
tember 13, 2018, negotiations started within the EU to reach a final agreement on the EU Cyber security 
Act.   
46 ENISA strategy 2016–2020 - Europa EU, available at:  
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/corporate/enisa-strategy. 
  -13- 
 Expertise: Developing and maintaining a high level of experts; 
 Policy: Assisting in developing policies necessary to meet the legal and regulatory 
requirements; 
 Capacity: Assisting in enhancing capacity building; 
 Community: Enhancing cooperation (e.g. support to the Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Teams (CERTs), coordination of pan-European cyber exercises); 
 Enabling: promoting the engagement with the stakeholders and international rela-
tions.  
1.5.2 ENISA’s Tasks 
Although most of the tasks performed by ENISA are new, there are also cases that the 
tasks were passed on from other institutions:” half of its tasks have been taken over 
from the Commission, the other half coming from the Member States. However, this is 
a matter of definition. Some analysis work in the area of network security was carried 
out before, both in the Commission and in various organizations, but overall there was 
no comprehensive approach at EU level or Member State level to this area, before ENI-
SA”47. 
The main tasks of ENISA in accordance with the Regulation are:  
 Advising and assisting the Commission and the Member States on information 
security.  
 Advising and assisting the Commission and the Member States in their dialogue 
with industry to address security-related problems in hardware and software 
products. 
 Collecting and analyzing data on security incidents in Europe and emerging 
risks.  
 Promoting risk assessment and risk management methods to enhance our capa-
bility to deal with information security threats.  
 Raising awareness and strengthening co-operation between different actors in 
the information security field, notably by developing public/private partnerships 
with industry in this field; 
                                                 
47 RAMBOL, Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III, Agency 
level findings (2009). 
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 Supporting the development of cybersecurity exercises in Europe and the in-
volved stakeholders in cyber exercises in Europe48. 
 
1.5.3  Recent activities of ENISA 
One of the key objectives of ENISA is to support the less advanced Member States on 
building their capabilities and capacities relative to the protection of Critical Infrastruc-
tures, into one acceptable level of security. For that purpose, ENISA has issued recom-
mendations and guides on best practice, such as49: 
 Methodologies for the identification of Critical Information Infrastructure assets 
and services50;  
 Technical Guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for 
Digital Service Providers; 
 Critical Information Infrastructures Protection (2015); 
 Guides on the formulation of national cybersecurity strategies: “NCSS best prac-
tice guide” (2016); 
 Technical Guideline on Security Measures (ENISA 2013); 
 Cloud Computing Risk Assessment (2009); 
 Guideline on Threats and Assets (2015). 
 
Additionally, ENISA has issued Guidance and recommendations on the industrial ICT 
control systems, such as: 
 Protecting Industrial Control Systems (2011); 
 Good practice guide for CERTs in the area of Industrial Control Systems (2012). 
 
ENISA also supports:  
 "The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience”, EP3R 2010-2013 
which was launched for enhancing cooperation between the public and private 
sectors on strategic security issues; 
                                                 
48 ENISA Cyber exercises platform, available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/cyber-
exercises/cyber-exercises-platform 
49ENISA counts 43 publications with recommendations and best practices. More information at: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications#c5=2008&c5=2018&c5=false&c2=publicationDate&reversed=
on&b_start=0&c10=Critical+Infrastructures+and+Services 
50 ENISA, Rossella Mattioli methodology, 2014. 
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 “The European Forum for the Member States” (EFMS) as a trusted shared 
mechanism for enabling discussions and information exchange between national 
competent authorities and national CERT teams for good practice relative to the 
resilience of ICT infrastructures, the organization of exercises at pan-European 
level etc; 
 The establishment of a national CERT providing guidance: “A Step-by-Step 
approach on how to set up a CSIRT”; 
 The development of the European Information Sharing and Alert Sys-
tem European (EISAS) for supporting the Member States their obligation to set 
up a national platform for reporting any significant cyber with the aim to raise 
public awareness on security issues: “How to raise information security aware-
ness”.  
In picture 3 we can see the ENISA’s activities framework.  
 
Picture 3: Strategic objectives of ENISA51  
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Ramboll Management Consulting, based on ENISA website. 
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2 Network and Information 
Systems Directive (NISD) 
2.1 NIS Directive general description and objectives 
Building upon other non-binding EU policies52, the Network and Information Systems 
Directive (NISD) is the first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity in the framework of 
the so-called “EU Cybersecurity strategy”. The Directive was adopted by the European 
Parliament on 6 July 2016 and entered into force in August 2016. In pursuant to its con-
text, Member States should have transposed it into their national laws by 9 May 2018 
and identify operators of essential services by 9 November 2018. 
The content of NISD may be translated as the European Union’s answer to the partial 
disregard of states to include cybersecurity within their national priorities. 
Particularly, although there have been established legislation regarding the protection of 
critical infrastructure, there have also been identified huge discrepancies at national 
readiness level, either because there were no adequate financial resources or because 
there was lack of awareness to a very high percentage. 
For this reason, the European Commission requires from all Member States, including 
the owners of the Critical infrastructures of the private sector53, to upgrade the cyberse-
curity issue among their key priorities, wishing to point out on the one hand that cyber 
risks do occur and, on the other hand, the need for universal application of specific 
technical and operational measures, for achieving a common maturity level within EU 
countries for resisting and responding effectively to these possible threats. 
The NIS Directive sets up the following three strategic pillars as its main objectives: 
 To raise public awareness and promote a culture of security across all vital sec-
tors of social life; 
                                                 
52 Fahey, The EU’s Cybercrime and Cyber-Security Rulemaking: Mapping the Internal and External Di-
mensions of EU Security, European Journal of Risk Regulation 2014, pp. 49-51. 
53 Since most the operation critical infrastructures are based on the digital services provided by the private 
sector.  
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 To support the Member States on strengthening their national capabilities54; 
 To promote better coordination and cooperation within EU by building trust 
among the Member States while building on the international cooperation. 
Critical actors of this focused European cybersecurity effort are the owners of the Criti-
cal Infrastructures (CI) since their provided operations and services are extremely essen-
tial to the economic growth of their country and highly depended on the extended use of 
ICT products. In other words, the European Commission forces certain key technology 
businesses and infrastructure providers focusing on maintaining a minimum common 
level of European security standards. 
Although the context of the Directive applies to all Member States it, however, applies 
to “operators of essential services” in the energy, transport, banking, financial market 
infrastructures, health sector, water and digital infrastructure sectors55and to certain 
“digital service providers”. 
 Pursuant to Directive’s content the following two distinct groups will be affected: 
I. “Operators of essential services”, in terms of a public and private entity, which 
fulfils any of the following criteria: 
 provide a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal 
and/or economic activities; 
 the provision of that service depends on network and information systems; and 
 An incident affecting those systems would have significant disruptive effects 
on the provision of that service; any security incident56 that may cause the 
disturbance of the provided critical services is considered an essential one57.  
 
Additionally, individual Member States must identify and draw up a list of these op-
erators. This list will include the larger operators from the above-mentioned CI and 
it will be reviewed periodically, not only from the individual Member States, but 
from the European Council (EC) too, for consistency purposes. 
 
                                                 
54 Advanced cyber security capabilities always offer more perspectives of improved selected capacities 
since strategic planning may reveal the existing vulnerabilities that they were not easily visible from the 
beginning.  
55 From Annex II. 
56 The security incident may be caused due to physical and cyber threats or human errors. 
57 According to Article 4 (4) NISD ‘operator of essential services’ means a public or private entity of a 
type referred to in Annex II, which meets the criteria laid down in Article 5(2). 
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II. Certain digital service providers (DSPs)58 or internet enablers, such as: 
• Online marketplaces; 
• Online search engines; and 
• Cloud computing services. 
Excluded from these procedures are the "micro and small enterprises'59.  
All these owners of CI, from both two distinct groups, are required to update their inci-
dent handling processes and notify immediately to the Member States’ representative 
(the defined national competent authority) of any cybersecurity incident, causing dis-
turbance of their services60.  
Additional significant players in shaping the European cybersecurity area are the indi-
vidual States. They particularly must locate the peculiarities and identify the existing 
governance mechanism behind these obligations, to decide on how they will be imple-
mented into national laws. 
More specifically the Member States are required to adopt a national cybersecurity 
strategy (NCSS) on the security of network and information systems 61 and to notify 
significant security incidents by designating national competent authorities (NCA), sin-
gle points of contacts (SPOC) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
(CSIRT) responsible for the effective handling of these incidents. Additionally, the 
NCSS requires the creation of a Co-operation Group (Coop-Group) for assuming the 
overall responsibility, for coordinating the efforts made by Member States and all relat-
ed stakeholders62, alongside with the creation of a Cybersecurity Incident Report Team 
network (CSIRT network), with a view to responding rapidly to cyber threats and inci-
dents63, based on experience gained and use of best practices of the security communi-
ties. 
The Member States were obliged to identify until 9.11.2018, businesses operating in 
their territory as "operators of essential services"64 and create a relevant list. To make 
sure that all Member States will follow a common approach for the identification of the 
                                                 
58 From Annex III. 
59 As it is defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 
60 Article 2(d). 
61 Article 2(a). 
62 Article 2(b). 
63 Article 2(c). 
64 Article 5 (1) NISD. 
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Operators of Essential Services65 (OESs), a list of each sector and subsector is provided 
through the Annex II of the Directive, to serve as a roadmap at the identification pro-
cess. 
 While the NISD requires the Member States to identify operators of essential services 
in their territory, it does not do the same with the digital service providers. 
According to the NIS Directive, identified operators OESs and DPSs are obliged to 
adopt appropriate security measures and notify serious cyber incidents to the relevant 
national authority. 
The details for achieving the NIS Directive’s implementation will be described into fol-
lowings paragraphs. 
2.2 General provisions of NISD 
The NISD provides the theoretical background for the necessary measures, that relevant 
stakeholders66 should set-up, having taken into consideration that its correct transposi-
tion into national laws would be jeopardized by the diversity at organizational and ad-
ministrative level from nation to nation. Additionally, the European Commission adopt-
ed on 13.09.2017 a Communication in order to support Member States to implement the 
NISD coherently across the EU67. 
For the purposes of achieving a coherent European approach, the Directive provides cri-
teria for identify OESs, and definitions for DSPs and technological digital provider 
products and terms, for ensuring the common understanding between Member States 
and CI relevant stakeholders. Additionally, it introduces certain processes to be fol-
lowed by the Member States for: 
 the provision of lex specialis; 
 classification of the impact of the incident; 
 controlling cross-border affection; 
 identifying the operators of essential services; 
 the content of the reviewed list of identified OESs; 
 the relationship between the NIS Directive and other legislation. 
                                                 
65 Article5. 
66 Member states, OESs and DSPs. 
67 Making the most of NIS – towards the effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 COM 
(2017) 476. 
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2.2.1 The provision of lex specialis 
Under lex specialis principle of Article 1(7), the operators of essential services and the 
digital service providers are not required to apply the security and notification require-
ments demanded by the NIS Directive as long as “an EU sector-specific legislation pro-
vides for security and notification requirements, which are at least equivalent in effect 
to the corresponding obligations of the NIS Directive”68. 
2.2.2 Classification of the impact 
The Directive defines an incident as critical when the continuity of the provided opera-
tions and services are negatively affected. However, the continuation of the service may 
be jeopardized not only in cases involving physical availability but also by malicious 
acts that endanger the provision of services. More precisely, as an incident may be con-
sidered any fact that has a real negative impact on the ability of networks and infor-
mation systems to resist to any act that compromises the availability, authenticity, integ-
rity and confidentiality of data stored or transmitted or processed, or any related ser-
vices offered by or through its networks and information systems69;  
For the coherent application of the measures by all Member States and relative stake-
holders from the public and private sector, some general criteria are provided for distin-
guishing critical incidents70:  
 “The number of users relying on the service provided by the entity concerned”71;  
 “The dependency of other sectors referred to in Annex II on the service provided 
by that entity”72;  
 “The impact that incidents could have, in terms of degree and duration, on eco-
nomic and societal activities or public safety”73;  
 “The market share of that entity”74;  
 “The geographic spread with regard to the area that could be affected by an inci-
dent”75;  
                                                 
68 Making the most of NIS – towards the effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148, COM 
(2017) 476, p. 36. 
69 Article4(7)(2) 
70 Article6(1) 
71 Article6(1)(a) 
72 Article6(1)(b) 
73 Article6(1)(c) 
74 Article6(1)(d) 
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 “The importance of the entity for maintaining a sufficient level of the service, 
taking into account, the availability of alternative means for the provision of that 
service”76.  
Further to the above-mentioned general criteria, the Member States should define 
sector-specific factors, that would probably cause a significant disruptive effect on 
provided essential services. Member States should consult with stakeholders of the crit-
ical infrastructure sectors indicated by Annex II of the Directive in order to decide joint-
ly which other important criteria should be included so that the implementation and ap-
plication of the above criteria would be effective. Examples of such criteria are given in 
table 2, such as for energy sector could be the volume or the proportion of national en-
ergy produced; for air transport sector (the airports and air carriers), sector-specific fac-
tor could be the proportion of national traffic volumes and the number of passenger or 
cargo operations per year77. 
Table 2: Examples of sector-specific factors to be considered for determining the significant 
disruptive effect in case of an incident. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
75 Article6(1)(e) 
76 Article6(1)(f) 
77 Recital 28 
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2.2.3 The cross-border affection 
When an entity provides services in two or more Member States, all Member States in-
volved will include it on their OESs lists. Bearing in mind that the Directive does not 
oblige the use of specific technical security products, this automatically implies a dis-
parity between the Member States concerning the preventing and ensuring the service’s 
continuation. For that purpose, Member States are obliged to consult each other in order 
to agree in a joint action plan, which will ensure that they are dealt with under a com-
mon legal framework, in order to avoid any inconsistency, which will hinder the effec-
tiveness of the Directive. 
However, there is the possibility the Member States do not come to an agreement; in 
that case, they may request assistance from the Cooperation Group78. The schematic of 
the cross-border affection process, is provided in diagram 1. 
 
Diagram 1: The cross-border affection process.  
 
 
                                                 
78 Recital 24. 
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2.2.4 The identification of operators of essential services 
To make sure that all Member States follow a common approach for the identification 
of the Operators of Essential Services79, a list of each sector and subsector is provided 
in Annex II of the Directive to serve as a roadmap in the identification process. 
Therefore, all Member States should initially record all the organizations, which are ac-
tive in the following Critical Infrastructure sectors, either as public or as private entities, 
and in accordance with Annex II:  
 Energy; 
 Transport; 
 Banking;  
 Financial market infrastructures;  
 Health sector;  
 Drinking water supply and Distribution; and, 
 Digital infrastructure; 
Particular attention should be paid to the possible existence of an EU legal act which 
imposes security and/or notification requirements on OESs like the requirements im-
posed by the NIS Directive80. 
In case it does exist, the NIS Directive requirements should not be applied to the opera-
tor of the services; otherwise, the identification process of the OESs should proceed. 
The next step includes the following two questions81 that need to be firmly answered for 
the service provider to fall within the scope of the NIS Directive: 
a. Is it an organization that provides a service essential to maintaining the social 
and economic development of the region?  
b. Is this service produced using networks and information systems?  
Following the identification process, the next question should be: 
 In the case of a cyber-attack on the provisions of the network and information 
systems, would this affect the continuation of this service?82 (The classification 
of impact process initiates). 
                                                 
79 Article 5. 
80 Article1(7). See also Esays, Breach notification requirements under the European Union legal frame-
work: Convergence, Conflicts, and Complexity in Compliance, The John Marshall Journal of Information 
Technology & Privacy Law 2014, Article 2, pp. 317-368, specifically pp. 329 et seq. 
81 Based on the criteria as mentioned in article 5(2)(a)(b). 
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Finally, Member States must answer the last one question to create the final form of the 
list with the identified OESs according to the NIS Directive:  
 Does the operator provide basic services in other Member States83? (The 
cross-border affection process initiates.) 
The identification process of OESs is provided by ENISA in diagram 284. 
Diagram 2: OESs identification process. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
82 Which condemns the devastating consequences of the interruption of this service, article 5(2)(c), the 
classification of impact process initiates. 
83 The OESs are required to notify the competent authority of the Member State where they have their 
main establishment, the cross-border affection process initiates. 
84 Making the most of NIS – towards the effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 COM 
(2017) 476  p. 28. 
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2.2.5 The reviewed list of OESs 
The above-mentioned list of OESs established by each Member State should be com-
municated to the European Commission in order to monitor the correct implementation 
of the identification process of the OESs at each national level. Moreover, Member 
States are required to submit to the Commission by 9 November 2018 and every two 
years thereafter the following information: 
 The list of essential services85;  
 The number of identified OES for each sector referred to in Annex II and the 
relevance of those operators for the sector86; and,  
 Thresholds identified for determining the supply level by reference to the num-
ber of users relying on that service or to the importance of that particular opera-
tor of essential services87. 
2.2.6 The relationship between the NIS Directive and other 
legislation. 
 Directive 2002/21/EC88: 
The Directive underpins that the security and notification requirements for operators of 
essential services and digital service providers identified from Annexes II and III are not 
applicable if these EU sectors are subject to the requirements of Article 13a and 13b of 
Directive 2002/21/EC. However, there is the possibility of the same company to provide 
digital services that are subject to the NIS Directive, such as cloud computing or ser-
vices such as the Internet Exchange Point (IXP)89. In that case, the company will be 
subject to the security and notification requirements of the NIS Directive and should be 
included in the list of the identified operators of essential services by the Member 
States. So, the Member States should identify properly all the providers of Domain 
Name Server (DNS), Internet Exchange Point (IXP)or Top-Level Domain (TLD) ser-
                                                 
85 Article 5(a). 
86 Article 5(b). 
87 Article 5(c). 
88 Recital 7. 
89 Annex II (7). According to COM (2017)476 final, p. 21, “The term Internet Exchange Point is defined 
in Article 4(13) and clarified further in recital 18 and can be described as a network facility that enables 
the interconnection of more than two independent technically stand-alone systems, with the primarily 
purpose to facilitate the exchange of internet traffic”. 
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vices that belong to the operators of essential services and thus should comply with the 
requirements of the NIS Directive.  
 Regulation (EU) No 910/201490: 
The NIS Directive shall not apply to trust service providers that are subject to Article 19 
Regulation (EU) No 910/201491. 
 Directives 2008/114/EC92, 2011/93/EU93, 2013/40/EU94: 
The NIS Directive applies without prejudice to Council Directive 2008/114/EC and Di-
rectives 2011/93/EU and 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council95. 
 Processing of personal data:  
Processing of personal data pursuant to NISD shall be conducted according to the Di-
rective 95/46/EC at the national level (since 25.5.2018 according to the General Data 
Protection Regulation), while at Union level under the Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. 
 Protection of essential interests: 
The Member States retain the right not to disclose data during the notification of inci-
dents that may affect the national security or may allow for the investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences96.  
2.3 Setting up the EU preparedness  
In order to deal with the problem of non-uniformity in the national legal framework ef-
fectively, it is necessary for all Member States to implement the NISD coherently. For 
that purpose, the Directive sets out a series of measures and obligations for the Member 
States such as: 
1. To develop a national strategy for the security of network and information sys-
tems, the so-called National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCSS)97.  
                                                 
90 Recital 7. 
91 Article 1(3). 
92Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008) p. 75. 
93 Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combat-
ing the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1). 
94 Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks 
against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA (OJ L 218, 
14.8.2013, p. 8. 
95 Article 1(4). 
96 Recital 8. 
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Through this measure the Member States are invited to set national targets and 
priorities, to adopt comprehensive policies and regulatory compliance measures 
that ensure high levels of the security of the networks and information systems. 
In order to do so, the NCSS should include: 
 Strategic objectives, priorities and governance framework; 
 Identification of measures on preparedness, response and recovery; 
 Cooperation methods between the public and private sectors; 
 Awareness raising, training and education; 
 Research and development plans related to NIS Strategy; 
 Risk assessment plan; 
 List of actors involved in the strategy implementation 
 
2. To adopt the following governance structure by setting-up98: 
 National Competent Authorities (NCA) to monitor the implementation of the 
Directive;  
 Single points of Contact (SPOCs) responsible for ensuring the cross-border 
cooperation between the Member States; and  
 CSIRTs responsible for the handling of incidents reported relative to the se-
curity of Network and Information Systems. 
 
Therefore, the Member States should begin by deciding first which key critical sectors 
should be considered significant for maintaining their economic prosperity, and the de-
velopment of the society.  
In the view of the author, the Member States should stay strictly limited to the given 
criteria concerning whether an organization provides essential services for maintaining 
the social and economic development of the internal market through the use of networks 
and information systems. Otherwise, diverse views could cause the incorrect application 
of the procedure,99 jeopardizing the minimum harmonization for OESs100.   
                                                                                                                                               
97 Article 1(2)(a). 
98 Article 1(2)(e). 
99 Identification process of OESs. 
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The Member States must communicate the list of OESs to the Commission101 and are 
required to review it by the endorsement, every two years at least, after 9 May 2018102. 
Bearing in mind that the security of networks and information systems is a continuously 
changing field, since more frequent and sophisticated risks are emerging, this list should 
also be in line with the actual current cyber threats.  
2.3.1 The National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCSS) 
The NISD defines the national cybersecurity strategy as the appropriate instrument for 
defining the national frameworks on the security of networks and information systems. 
So, all Member States are required to set the cybersecurity concern as a priority into 
their national strategies, and finally adopt a National Cybersecurity Strategy. In case 
some Member States have already a national framework in place, where cybersecurity 
challenges are included in its generic key themes, they are additionally required to re-
view it in a manner that it will be enhanced with the NIS Directive’s objectives, in 
building on the preparedness and resilience103 of the Member States, on addressing the 
cyber-attacks affecting the security of Network and Information Systems within the EU.  
However, the cyber-protection of the EU is a collective effort. And the correct transpo-
sition of the NIS Directive into the national legal systems is a fundamental condition for 
the achievement of the NIS Directive’s objectives. 
Although the drafting procedure of the cybersecurity strategy is not described in the Di-
rective104, it emphasizes what should be included105.  
So, each Member State is required to create a national cybersecurity strategy including, 
a framework of activities serving as a complementary to the clearly defined strategic 
priorities and objectives on the security of network and information systems106. The cre-
ation of a national cybersecurity strategy includes two stages:  
 The designing and developing;  
 The implementation and maintenance. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
100 Article3. 
101 Article 7. 
102 Article5(5). 
103 Article 7 (1) (c). 
104 Neither Article 7 nor the corresponding recital 29 specify the process. 
105 It sets out the theoretical background for the developing issues on a NCSS. 
106 Article 7 (1)(a). 
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During the drafting process of NCSS, each country must define what the desired out-
comes107 are and how they can be accomplished.  
It is useful for the Member States to adopt a national cybersecurity strategy that will en-
compass all those areas of considerable value for the social and economic activity of the 
country. The Directive obliges them to do so in order to set a minimum threshold for 
joint action108.  
The Commission recognizes that this process will be complex and demands the en-
gagement from many different stakeholders, which are considered an expert in the spec-
ified field. For that purpose, the Commission introduces the continuous commitment 
from ENISA109, due to its speciality being considered as an expert in the security of the 
Networks and Information Systems, with relevant workshop activities. 
So, the Member States should initially document clearly and defined at least the follow-
ing requirements for110: 
 Identifying and reviewing an existing institutional framework involved in the 
implementation of the NCSS for ensuring an efficient and effective cooperation 
between national authorities111 ;  
 Creating a comprehensive legal framework covering all cases of network and in-
formation security, alongside with the cybercrime and the protection of personal 
data; 
 Developing an information security policy focusing on the protection of hard-
ware, software and physical working spaces, to an advanced level112; 
 Organizing educational programs by training and raising awareness in security 
topics, for citizens and user;  
 Performing a risk assessment for assessing the existing security measures so as 
to develop, implement and review the strategy113; 
 Setting a clearly defined governance structure with roles, responsibilities and ac-
countability of all relevant stakeholders114; 
                                                 
107 Article 1(a), objectives and priorities. 
108 Setting the minimum common level within Europe. 
109 Article 7(2). 
110In accordance with the ENISA’s guidelines on NCSS (NCSS Good Practice Guide), available at: 
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ncss-good-practice-guide>  
111 Article 7(1)(g). 
112 Article 7(1)(a). 
113 The identification of measures relating to preparedness, article 7(1)(c) (f). 
114 Article 7(1)(b). 
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 Establish trusted information-sharing mechanisms for promoting and establish-
ing cooperation and coordination between different relevant stakeholders from 
the public and private area115, on both the national and international level116; 
 Identifying the operators of essential services117; 
 Identifying the mitigation treatment to specific cyber threats and risk levels118;  
 Developing National cyber contingency plans119, including implementation of 
the selected mitigation treatment to specific cyber threats and risk levels120; 
 Organizing Cybersecurity exercises at the national level121; 
 Setting baseline security countermeasures for all the relevant stakeholders from 
both of public and private area; 
 Developing incident reporting mechanisms while identifying and enhancing the 
national incident response capabilities; 
 Communicating the incidents and impacts for raising users and public aware-
ness122; 
 Organizing training and educational programmes performed at regular time in-
tervals; 
 Involving with international cooperation; 
 Establishing a public-private partnership; 
 Designating national competent authorities (NCA), CSIRTs and single point of 
contact (SPOC) within public agencies; 
 Supporting Research and Development and Academic Education Programs123; 
 
 
                                                 
115 For facilitating cooperation between private and public sector, article 7(1)(c). 
116 Article 10. 
117 Article 7(1)(g). 
118 Implied from articles 7(1)(c) and (g). 
119 An identified measure for recovering from cyber threats, article 7(1)(c). 
120 Implied from articles 7(1)(c) and (g). 
121 “An indication of training programmes”, article 7(1)(e). 
122 “An indication of relevant awareness-raising programmes”, article 7(1)(e). 
123 “An indication of relevant education programmes”, article 7(1)(e). 
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2.3.2 Setting up the national monitoring framework  
In order the NISD to be properly implemented at the pan-European level, it is necessary 
to introduce the instruments responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Di-
rective initially at the national level. So, each Member State is required to assign at least 
three roles for ensuring the correct transposition of the NIS Directive into the national 
legal framework. These roles are:   
 national competent authority (NCA); 
 a single point of contact (SPOC); 
 a national CSIRT. 
 
2.3.2.1 The role of the national competent authority  
Each Member State is required to designate one or more124national competent authori-
ties for being accountable mainly for the identified OESs and DSPs125, without exclud-
ing the option to also cover additional sectors and services126. The role of the national 
competent authority is the monitoring of the implementation process127 of the NIS Di-
rective at the national level128, and this role may be assigned within an existing authori-
ty129. 
Therefore, Member States are free to choose either a central authority dealing with all 
sectors and services covered by the Directive or several authorities, depending for ex-
ample on the type of sector, based on the differences in national governance struc-
tures130. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124 Member States have the option to choose which governance approach would be more efficient and 
effective so as to function complementary to the overall national governance they use: a) the centralized 
approach; b) the decentralized approach; c) the hybrid approach. 
125Annexes I &II. 
126Article 8 (1):” covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex II and the services referred to in Annex 
III”. 
127 In case of non-compliance the national competent authority has the right to impose an effective pro-
portionate and dissuasive sanction, considering various factors such as the gravity or frequency of the 
infringement, article 21 NISD. 
128 Article 8(2). 
129 Article 8(1). 
130 Recital 30. 
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2.3.2.1.1 Governance structures  
A.  Centralized approach: This type is characterized by a central cybersecurity au-
thority with wide responsibilities and capabilities within different sectors.  
B.  Decentralized approach: This type is characterized by a strong degree of coopera-
tion between multiple sector-based authorities being responsible for specific sectors 
and services. 
C. Hybrid approach: This type is characterized by the combination of elements of 
both centralized and decentralized approaches. 
Examples of the above-mentioned governance structures are given in picture 5131. 
 
Picture 5: Governance structures: A. centralized; B. decentralized; C. hybrid 
 
2.3.2.2 The role of the single point of contact (SPOC). 
 Each Member State is required to designate a national competent authority as a single 
point of contact (SPOC), to function as an intermediary132 with: 
 The relevant authorities at the national level: 
a national competent authority requests the single point of contact to forward the notifi-
cation of an incident to initiate the cross-border affection process for the Member States 
that are affected by the incident.  
 The corresponding SPOCs of other Member States: 
The single point of contact of one Member State forwards the notification of the inci-
dent to the relevant national competent authorities and the CSIRTs for sharing infor-
mation and managing the risk. 
 
                                                 
131 NCSS Good Practice Guide, p. 18. 
132 Article 8(4). 
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  The cooperation Group: 
Τhe single point of contact of each Member State must submit every year a summary 
report to the Cooperation Group133 on received incident notifications reporting the num-
ber of notifications, the nature of the incidents and the measures taken by the national 
authorities. 
 The CSIRT network134:  
in situations that the single point of contact is also the CSIRT for exchanging infor-
mation relative to incident handling and reporting. 
  
Therefore, we may see that the role of the single point of contact is quite strategic for 
establishing a “trusted cross-border information sharing mechanism135” in order to facil-
itate the identification and cooperation of competent authorities, between different 
Member States136; in case of a significant security incident occurrence, the incident noti-
fication process should strictly define as a proper communication process, only the di-
rect communication of SPOC, with corresponding ones at Union level.  
In case a Member State adopts a centralized governance approach, the designated na-
tional competent authority (NCA) will also have the role of the single point of contact 
(SPOC)137. 
The Member States are obliged to inform the Commission about the designation of the 
single point of contact and its tasks by the transposition deadline.  
Afterwards, the Commission shall publish the list of designated single points of contact 
for ensuring transparency and effective coordination, between the relevant authorities at 
national and European level too138.  
 
 
 
                                                 
133 The Coop-Group is the responsible authority for coordinating the efforts made by Member States and 
all related stakeholders during the transposition of the NISD into national laws. Further analysis about the 
Coop-Group at paragraph 2.4.1. 
134 A network of national CSIRTs for operational cooperation between Member States under Article 12   
135 ENISA, NCSS Good Practice Guide, p. 20. 
136 Article 8(4), recital 31. 
137 Article 8(3). 
138 And even at global level too. 
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2.3.2.3 The role of the CSIRT  
Each Member State is required to create a team of IT139 security experts, responsible for 
responding to the computer security incidents140, based on certain capabilities and re-
quirements141 defined in a relative policy document. This policy should be communicat-
ed to the Commission142.  
The role of the CSIRT includes: 
 The monitoring of the incidents143; 
 The provision of early warning, alerts and information sharing to relevant stake-
holders in case of incidents reported144; 
 The response to incidents145; 
 The provision of dynamic146 risk and incident analysis and raising situational 
awareness147; 
 The Participation in a network of the CSIRTs148 within EU. 
 
The Directive defines the theoretical base, under which the framework of activities of 
the CSIRT should be adopted, aiming the strengthening of the EU resilience on 
cybersecurity risks. Additionally, ENISA has provided a relative guidance for the 
Member States in order to support their efforts in creating a CSIRT149.  
 
 
                                                 
139 Information technology. 
140 By providing to the relative stakeholders from the Critical Information, public and private sector, all 
the necessary services in order to handle the IT security incidents and support the continuity of the ser-
vices. 
141 Annex I. 
142 Article 9. 
143 Annex I (2)(a). 
144 Annex I (2) (b). 
145 Annex I (2) (c). 
146 Dynamic in the sense that the data changes as the time passes by and the actions taken to cope with the 
incident will also change till the succeed respond to the cyber threat.  
147 Annex I (2) (d). 
148 Through partnerships with public and private area and cooperation with CSIRTs’ from different Mem-
ber States, based on the tasks referred in Annex I(2)(c)(d). 
149 ENISA, A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2). 
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In accordance with ENISA study, the nature of the expected function of the CSIRT, 
should be characterized by150:  
 Pro-activity: in terms of preparedness, through awareness building and training; 
 Reactivity: in terms of providing incident handling and mitigation treatment ac-
tivities151;  
 Artifact handling: performed through analysis of the evidence found152; 
 Security and quality management services: provided through clearly defined re-
sponding and mitigation plans. 
The creation of a CSIRT includes two stages: 
A. The development of the operation plan; and,  
B. The implementation and maintenance of the operation plan.  
 
A. The development of the operation plan 
The Member States should develop an operation plan with clearly defined procedures 
ensuring the security, the quality and the strengthening of the provided services from 
the CSIRT. More specifically, the creation of the CSIRT entity should be complement-
ed by a policy document focusing on the following priorities: 
1. Planning for monetary issues153: The financial support154 for the proper function 
of the CSIRT must be clearly defined. 
2. Defining the organizational structure: The Member States have the right to 
choose the governance model that is in line with the already existing organizational 
framework for their operation and cooperation at the national level. 
It will be possible either to designate a centrally independent CSIRT that will be re-
sponsible for all OESs and DSPs, at least or more than one155 CSIRTs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 These are implied in the CSIRT tasks in Annex I (2), in accordance with European Commission - Fact 
Sheet “Questions and Answers: Directive on Security of Network and Information systems, the first EU-
wide legislation on cyber security”.  
151 Based on the tasks of the Annex I (2). 
152 Based on the requirement of Annex I (3).  
153 Article 9 (2): “adequate resources”. 
154 E.g. use of existing resources, subsidiary, membership fee. 
155 Article 9 (1). 
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Example 1: The independent business model 
The CSIRT team is not part of the organization structure; it is an independent body, 
with its own administration and personnel (picture 6). 
Picture 6: The independent CSIRT model156. 
 
Example 2: The built-in model 
The CSIRT group is established within an existing organization157 and uses the 
existing ICT infrastructure for performing its tasks. 
By studying picture 8, we understand that in this model there is one person re-
sponsible for concentrating the necessary technicians158 and coordinating their 
activities concerning the solution of each different problem that arises (picture 
7). 
                                                 
156 ENISA, A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2). 
157 In the case of Greece, The National Authority Against Electronic Attacks (NAAEA) is also the nation-
al computer emergency response team. 
158 Based on their expertise capabilities. 
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Picture 7: The embedded CSIRT model159. 
 
3. Hiring the right staff: The CSIRT should consist of personnel with technical exper-
tise160 and very good communication skills161 in order to perform their daily activities, 
while communicating either between the team members or with other response teams 
from different critical sectors. The number of the required skilled people to perform the 
job, should be defined with accuracy complemented by their roles and responsibilities 
and the dedicated communication channels through their establishment they are able to 
ensure availability at anytime162. 
4. Describing the utilization and equipment of the office: this section should include 
information concerning: 
1. General rules about the building, for ensuring that the office can be accessible 
only from the authorized personnel163; 
 
2. The establishment and maintenance of communication channels164 used from 
and to the CSIRT: these should be secure and strictly defined, due to the very 
                                                 
159 ENISA, A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2). 
160 E.g. broad knowledge of internet technology and protocols. 
161 E.g. flexible, creative and a good team spirit. 
162 Counting even the holidays for back up support, annex I (1)(c)(ii). 
163 This may be achieved by using access control systems, CCTV systems, CSIRT office, use of special 
lockers for the storage of important archives etc. 
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sensitive nature of the information exchanging. This implies that a list of the 
provided communication channels,165  alongside with the designated roles and 
responsibilities should be provided; 
3. Defining the systems used for searching for records either for the main func-
tion or for backup support such as: 
 Contact database with details of team members, of CSIRT network, or 
other CSIRT form different critical infrastructure sectors, for ensuring 
the availability of the CSIRT166 ; and, 
 Tools used for the proper function of the CSIRT concerning: 
 Incident handling (e.g. RTIR); 
 CRM Tools 167(e.g. Sugar CRM and Sugarforce). 
4. Developing an Information Security Policy in line with national legislation, 
European regulations and international agreements for addressing: 
a. The management of the protection of the existing ICT and building infrastruc-
ture168 taking into consideration additionally possible physical threats and 
human errors whilst ensuring the availability of the CSIRT’s assistance; 
b. General rules for IT equipment concerning the hardening of the systems169 and 
the proper and secure use from staff170should be adopted and maintained. An 
indicative tool may be: “Email and message encryption software”171(e.g. 
GnuPG, PGP). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
164 “Besides using e-mail, web-forms, phone or fax to facilitate incident handling (to receive incident re-
ports from the constituency, coordinate with other teams or give feedback and support to the victim) most 
CSIRTs publish their security advisories on a publicly available website and via a mailing lists”- ENISA, 
A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT,  Deliverable WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2), page 16. 
165 Annex I(1)(a): “have several means for being contacted”, ensuring a “high level of availability of their 
communications services by avoiding single points of failure “. 
166 “A high level of availability of their communications services by avoiding single points of failure”, 
Annex I(1)(a). 
167 CRM (Customer Relationship Management) used for compiling customer data across different com-
munication channels. 
168Some of such security mechanisms for ensuring the physical protection of the building could be: access 
control system, CCTV system etc. 
169 The use of security software such as: firewalls, multiple anti-virus scanners, anti-spyware, etc. 
170 This may be achieved by establishing formal guidelines regarding the hardening of the systems used 
(e.g. patch and update all the systems before connecting them to the internet).  
171Article 9 (3). See also ENISA, A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable 
WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2), p. 53. 
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c. The backup system and workspace defined for managing and routing requests, 
alongside with the roles and the responsibilities of the involved persons, en-
suring the business continuity172. 
d. The promotion of cooperation through established communication channels 
and partnerships, with a public and private area, such as:  
 The CSIRT network173; 
 The TF-CSIRT174 Task Force through an established forum for sharing 
information with CSIRT in Europe. 
 FIRST175. 
e. The establishment of an education program implemented at three levels: 
 The training of the CSIRT; 
 The raising of awareness of the public and the CSIRT176; it is obtained 
through the communication of the incidents’ impact.  
 Developing and implementing exercises for assessing the readiness of each 
Member State. 
 
B.  The implementation and maintenance of the operation plan 
Each Member State is required to establish and maintain processes regarding the inci-
dent handling and notification, complemented by the definition of the selected applica-
ble technology infrastructure. 
The core services of the CSIRT are: 
 Alerts and Warnings; 
 Incident Handling; 
 Announcement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Annex I (1)(c). 
173 Article 9(2). 
174 TF-CSIRT: ENISA, A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable WP2006/5.1(CERT-
D1/D2), p. 30. 
175 On FIRST see ENISA, A step-by-step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable 
WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2), p.30. 
176By participating in training courses e.g. organized by TRANSIT and CERT/CC. Cf. ENISA, A step-by-
step approach on how to set a CSIRT, Deliverable WP2006/5.1(CERT-D1/D2), pp. 54-55. 
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Additionally, the action plan should include procedures regarding the: 
 Analysis and responses; 
 Collaboration and coordination; 
 Notification and communication. 
 
i) Analysis and responses; 
During this phase, the Member States must define clearly the selected way177 for: 
 Collecting information; 
 Evaluating the information considering the relevance and the source; 
 Performing a Risk assessment178 for determining the acceptable risk level; 
 Selecting and applying the appropriate security mechanisms alongside with the 
defining processes followed for handling the security incidents179. 
 
ii) Collaboration and coordination; 
During this phase, the Member States must define in detail the process followed for 
communicating with the CSIRT network for sharing information related to incident re-
sponses, and the point of contact (representative) of each critical sector (public and pri-
vate). 
 
iii)  Notification and communication. 
During this phase, the Member States must define in detail, the process followed by 
the single point of contact, for initiating the cross-border affection notification and for 
the communicating the incident to the public. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
177 Based on a free choice of scientific methodologies, however considering clearly defined criteria for 
classification of incidents and impacts purposes.  
178 The confrontation of the vulnerabilities with the identified critical assets in order to identify the possi-
ble threat(s) for each asset. 
179 Annex I(2)(c). 
  -43- 
2.4 Enhancing EU cooperation and coordination 
The next strategic pillar of the NIS Directive focuses on increasing the EU level coop-
eration and coordination for building confidence and trust among the Member States.  
This is planned through:  
 The creation of a Cooperation Group; and,  
 The creation of a CSIRT network. 
2.4.1 The role of the Cooperation Group (Coop-Group) 
The NIS Directive introduces the establishment of a Coop-Group, responsible for facili-
tating the communication and therefore the cooperation between the Member States. 
The cooperation Group is composed of representatives from: 
 ENISA 
 The Member States180, and   
 the European Commission (EC), who acts as a secretariat of the Coop-Group. 
 
The role of the Coop-Group is crucial in providing guidance to the CSIRT network for 
sharing information and best practice on the one hand, and generally to the Member 
States, for enhancing their capacities in relation to exchanging best practice, security 
measures and raising awareness.  
More specifically, the Coop-Group’s tasks, as referred to in article 11(3) are; 
a) Defining the way, the CSIRTs network performs its tasks, by providing strategic 
guidelines to the CSIRT network181; 
b) The provision of guidelines to the CSIRT network for exchanging best practices for 
handling incidents182; 
c) The provision of non-binding guidelines to the Member States, supported by ENI-
SA’s workshop activities, for exchanging best practice, aiming to assist in building 
national capacities on the security of networks and information systems183; 
                                                 
180 The Presidency of the Council of the EU is the chair of the Cooperation Group. 
181 Article 11(3)(a). 
182 Article 11(3)(b). 
183 Article 11(3)(c). 
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d) The productive184 provision of consultant support to the Member States for evaluat-
ing the national capabilities and capacities, on a voluntary basis, and the effective-
ness of CSIRTs185; 
e) The exchanging of information and best practice concerning training and awareness-
raising186; 
f) The exchanging of information and best practice on the security of network and in-
formation systems, relative to research and development187; 
g) Maintaining of communication with relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies and exchanges experiences on relative security issues188; 
h) Building on a standardization approach with the assistance of relevant European 
standardization organizations189; 
i) The concentration of best practice information relative to risks and incidents190; 
j) The examination, on an annual basis, of the summary reports from the Single Point 
of Contacts with information relative to the incident notification191; 
k) Organizing cybersecurity exercises, education programmes and training, supported 
by ENISA192;  
l) The establishment of the following processes, supported by ENISA’s contribution: 
 The identification process of operators of essential services by the Member 
States; 
 The cross-border affection process for notifying incidents to the neighboring 
Member States193; 
m) The consistent work on defining proper non-binding guidelines on incident notifica-
tions194. 
 
The Group’s decisions are made by consensus; it may establish sub-groups to examine 
specific questions related to its work. The duration of the work programs is two years195 
                                                 
184 Through the discussion process the cooperation group identifies best practices and promotes them ac-
cordingly. 
185 Article 11(3)(d). 
186 Article 11(3)(e). 
187 Article 11(3)(f). 
188 Article 11(3)(g). 
189 Article 11(3)(h). 
190 Article 11(3)(i). 
191 Article 11(3)(j). 
192 Article 11(3)(k). 
193 Article 11(3)(l). 
194 Article 11(3)(m). 
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and every fifteen months it is required to provide a report to the Commission, clarifying 
the positive contribution of the cooperation196. This report also functions as input to the 
European Commission’s review of the Directive. 
The Coop-Group has so far produced the following five documents: 
 Compendium on cybersecurity of election technology; 
 Cybersecurity incident taxonomy; 
 Guidelines on notification of Operators of Essential Services incidents (formats 
and procedures); 
 Guidelines on notification of Digital Service Provider's incidents (formats and 
procedures); 
 Reference document on the identification of Operators of Essential Services 
(modalities of the consultation process in cases with cross-border impact). 
2.4.2 The role of CSIRT Network  
While Coop-Group aims to promote EU-level strategic cooperation, CSIRT network 
aims to foster EU-level effective operational cooperation and again to build trust and 
confidence between the Member States.  
The role of CSIRT network is the provision of a communication channel (a forum) 
through which CSIRTs from each Member State can cooperate in exchanging infor-
mation and best practice in relevance with the reported cybersecurity incidents on the 
networks and the information systems of the operators of essential services and digital 
service providers. A necessary prerequisite for this communication to be effective is the 
existence of trust and confidence among the members of the CSIRT network and 
therefore among the Member States197. 
The Members of the CSIRT network are representatives from198: 
 Member States’ CSIRTs and CERT-EU199; and, 
 ENISA, who will act as the secretariat200 and an active supporter for incident 
coordination upon request201.  
                                                                                                                                               
195 “Every two years thereafter, the Cooperation Group shall establish a work programme in respect of 
actions to be undertaken”, Article 11(3). 
196 Article 11(4). 
197 Article 12(1). 
198 Article 12(2). 
199 The Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, agencies and bodies. 
200 The Commission will participate in the CSIRTs Network as an observer. 
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The CSIRT network is required to perform the following tasks: 
a. The exchanging of information related to services, operations of the CSIRT202;  
b. During the investigation process a representative of the Member State’s CSIRT 
that has potentially been affected by the reported incident, may be requested to 
disclose confidential information; However, any Member State's CSIRT has the 
right to not contribute to that debating if this is going to jeopardize the investiga-
tion of the incident203; 
c. The sharing and making available on a voluntary basis non-confidential data 
concerning individual incidents204; 
d. The establishment of coordination responses to an incident that has been identi-
fied within the jurisdiction of that same Member State through the discussing 
with the representative of a Member State's CSIRT205;  
e. The provision of guidelines and support to the Member States for handling 
cross-border significant security incidents on a voluntary basis206; 
f. The identification of additional types of operational cooperation considering the: 
 categories of risks and incidents; 
 early warnings;  
 mutual assistance; 
 principles and types of coordination, when Member States reply to cross-
border risks and incidents207; 
g. The preparation of a report containing its activities with the additional identified 
types of operational cooperation discussed pursuant to point (f), and forwarding 
it to the Cooperation Group in order to request for guidance208; 
h. The provision of activities for raising awareness from gained experience through 
the cybersecurity exercises, including from those organized by ENISA209; 
i. The provision of guidance to the Member States, through their representatives in 
the CSIRT, for enhancing their national capabilities and preparedness210; 
                                                                                                                                               
201 European Commission - Fact Sheet- Questions and Answers: Directive on Security of Network and 
Information systems, the first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, p. 2. 
202 Article 12(3)(a). 
203 Article 12(3)(b). 
204 Article 12(3)(c). 
205 Article 12(3)(d). 
206 Article 12(3)(e). 
207 Article 12(3)(f). 
208 Article 13(3)(g). 
209 Article 13(3)(h). 
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j. The issuing of guidelines to be followed for a coherent operational approach 
from all the CSIRTs regarding the coordination-cooperation211 among them.  
 
Two years after entry into force of the NISD (by 9 August 2018), and every 18 months 
thereafter, the CSIRTs Network is required to provide an assessment report of the bene-
fits obtained through the operational cooperation, including conclusions and recom-
mendations, to the Commission212. 
 
2.5 Security requirements for OESs  
The security requirements for OESs engage the participation of individual OESs and the 
Member States, for ensuring not only that OESs have implemented the appropriate and 
proportionate security measures, but also the significant security incidents that have 
been notified to relative entities.  These are achieved by focusing on: 
 The appropriate and proportionate security measures adopted by the operators 
for essential services; 
 The compulsory notification of the significant incidents, by the operators of es-
sential services; 
 The compulsory notification of incidents with a significant impact on the provi-
sion of the essential services by the Member States; 
 The role of the national competent authority as an external auditor. 
2.5.1 OESs’ Security measures  
OESs are required to assess the effectiveness of the existing technical and organization-
al controls213 in order to evaluate the level of their preparedness, regarding the security 
of the networks and information systems they use for the provided services214. The se-
lected management risk approach should maintain the character of prevention, reaction 
and limitation of impact over the disruption of the provided essential, to the society and 
economy, services. Additionally, they are also required to develop, implement and 
                                                                                                                                               
210 Article 12(3)(i). 
211 The CSIRTs network shall lay down its own rules of procedures, article 12(3)(j). 
212 This will serve as a contribution to the review of the functioning of the Directive. 
213 To perform a risk assessment process.  
214 Article 14(1). 
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maintain a business contingency plan215 with clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
of the involved entities in accordance with their tasks, and strictly defined communica-
tion channels, through which the availability, confidentiality and effectiveness will be 
strengthened. The Directive does not indicate the type of methodology for performing 
relevant risk assessments nor the form of technology216 to be used. This implies that 
OESs that already have established an information security management system 
(ISMS)217 for addressing relative security issues, should review whether the existing 
security policies and the corresponding procedures address essthe identified cyber risks 
or not, and adjust them to a new management risk approach218. The main concern is the 
level of the provided protection219, for establishing a minimum common level of net-
works and information systems security, across the EU. It is worthwhile to mention that 
in case a significant incident has been notified by the operators of essential services, this 
does not increase their liability220; even if they had implemented the appropriate organi-
zational and technical measures, required by the Directive, there is always the possibil-
ity that a new sophisticated cyber threat arises that challenges the proper operation of 
their networks and information systems221. At this point, the Directive implies that their 
risk management approach should include a “monitoring process” at two stages: 
i. One after the selection of the specific control mechanisms that are assessed 
appropriate for the handling of risk; and, 
ii. A second one, after the implementation of the finally selected control mecha-
nisms. 
At both above situations, the relevant stakeholders of OESs may improve their aware-
ness and their educational culture on the frequent changing cyber threat landscape.  
Summing up, we understand that the proposed security measures that should be adopted 
by the Operators of Essential Services should consider the following five points: 
1. Identify; 
2. Protect; 
3. Detect; 
                                                 
215 Article 14(2). 
216 The capacity of the selected measures. 
217 An ISMS is a set of policies and procedures documented for systematically managing an organization's 
sensitive data. 
218 Implement specific security mechanisms for controlling the risks. 
219 The capability of the selected measures. 
220 Article 14(3). 
221 “Notification shall not make the notifying party subject to increased liability”, article 14(3). 
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4. Respond; and  
5. Recover.  
So, the minimum security domains that all OESs should cover in the developing of the 
information security management system are222: 
1. Risk Management and governance; 
2. The information security policy for addressing systems and facilities; 
3. Human resources policy; 
4. Contingency plan; 
5. Security education, Training and Awareness Program; 
6. Communications and management Operations; 
7. Incident reporting notification; 
8. Monitoring, auditing and testing. 
 
2.5.2 Notification requirements for OESs 
OESs are obliged to report incidents that fall under the scope of the NIS Directive. Any 
significant incident, having a serious impact on the service provided, must be notified to 
the national competent authority (NCA) or national CSIRT immediately. As a reporta-
ble incident the Directive underpins any incident with a significant impact on the conti-
nuity of an essential service provided by OESs; in other words, the incident that may 
entail the interruption of the essential service and thus not being operational for a given 
period of time.  
The Directive provides specific parameters/criteria to be applied by all operators of es-
sential services for assessing the type of incident223. Thus, the “classification of the in-
cident” should be determined by: 
a. The number of users that were affected by the disruption of an essential ser-
vice224;  
b. The time interval that the essential service was not operational225; 
c. The geographical spread of the area that was affected by the incident226. 
                                                 
222 The least required under the NIS Directive’s objectives for achieving the minimum common level of 
security and operational measures at EU. 
223 To assess the significance of the incident, article 14(5). 
224 Article 14(a) 
225 Article 14(b) 
-50- 
The mentioned-above process for classifying the incidents implies that OESs should be 
required to review the corresponding processes by adopting the required by the Di-
rective parameters for the classification of incidents.  
Additionally, we have already seen that Directive provides the criteria for the “classifi-
cation of the impact”, at paragraph 2.2.2. 
There is the possibility the same services of OESs are also provided to the other Mem-
ber States. Additionally, there is also the possibility the affected services may be inter-
connected with other services either at the national level, or EU level. In both cases, the 
single point of contact (SPOC) of Member States, that notifies a significant incident, 
must forward the incident notification to the corresponding SPOC of the possibly af-
fected Member State. To paragraph 2.2.3, we have already examined the process de-
fined by the Directive for addressing the “cross-border affection”227 between different 
Member States, and the outcome of this process will reveal the individual Member State 
with the responsibility to notify the security incident. In that case, the duplication of the 
reported incident is avoided.  
 The type of data that will be provided from the NCA or the CSIRT to SPOC for initiat-
ing the cross-border notification process, will preserve the security and commercial in-
terest of the notifying party, as well as the confidentiality of the information provided in 
its notification. 
Once the notification of the significant incident has been performed, NCA or CSIRT 
will support with incident handling assistance the notifying entity228. 
 There is sometimes the necessity to communicate the incident to the public; in this situ-
ation Member States may choose either the NCA or CSIRT, after having consulted the 
notifying operator of essential services, to communicate the individual incident to the 
public, or the notifying operator itself, for raising public awareness on preventing or 
dealing with an ongoing incident229. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
226 Article 14(c) 
227 Recital 24. 
228 Article 14(5). 
229 Article 14(6). 
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Picture 7: Overview of the incident reporting process for OESs230. 
 
By following the incident notification process for OESs, illustrated in picture 7 we iden-
tify the steps that should be taken by the responsible entities with this order: 
1. OESs of country A may come across with a security incident. 
2. OESs performs its defined “classification of incident” process, based on the 
parameters provided by the Directive in Article 14(4), so as to assess whether 
the incident should be reported to the NCA or CSIRT. 
3. NCA, that receives the reported incident, should assess the significance of the 
impact on the provision of the essential service, by performing the “classifica-
tion of impact” process defined in paragraph 2.2.2. 
4. NCA additionally should assess whether other Member States may be affect-
ed231 by the significant impact of the reported security incident by OES of coun-
try A. 
5. In case the security incident should be communicated to more Member States, 
NCA or CSIRT forwards the reported incident to SPOC of country A, by re-
questing to be extended forward to the Member States that were indicated as be-
ing affected through the cross-border affection process (paragraph 2.2.3). Thus, 
                                                 
230
NIS Coop-Group, Reference document on Incident Notification for Operators of Essential Services, p. 
8. 
231 Perform the cross-border affection process. 
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SPOC of country A forwards the reported incident to SPOC of e.g. country B in 
order to forward it to the relative competent authority or CSIRT of country B. 
6. The CSIRT will provide support to the notifying operator of essential services 
for handling the incident. 
7. The national competent authority or the CSIRT or the notifying operator of es-
sential services of country A will communicate the incident to the public for 
raising awareness purposes. 
8. In the meantime, SPOC communicates with the Coop-Group for receiving guid-
ance and support from CSIRT network for receiving the necessary for incident 
handling assistance, in case it is needed. 
 
2.5.3 Member States’ role as an external auditor under the incident 
notification requirement for OESs 
National competent authorities are responsible for ensuring that OESs are compliant 
to their obligations as they are provided in Article 14, for taking the appropriate and 
proportionate security and operational measures, including documented security pol-
icies, for ensuring the state-of-the-art security level of the networks and information 
systems used for the provision of their essential services. 
The role of national competent authorities is to serve as an external auditor to OESs 
with the responsibility to monitor their compliance with the NIS Directive’s notifi-
cation objectives. The proper and efficient function of this auditing team is highly 
depended on the establishment of an operational policy with the complemented stra-
tegic objectives and priorities (e.g. the educational background of personnel). This 
auditing team should additionally be equipped with appropriately qualified person-
nel complemented by the necessary capacity in numbers and facilities232. The Mem-
ber States may determine the assessment types the competent authorities may follow 
during performing their tasks; usually, the auditors combine the review of existing 
security policies with interviewing the chief information security officer (CISO) 
about contingency planning233.  
                                                 
232 Article 15(1). 
233ENISA, Technical guidelines on the security measures in Article 13a, p. 35, available at: 
https://www.rtr.at/de/tk/Netzsicherheit/Article_13a_ENISA_Technical_Guideline_On_Security_Measure
s_v2_0.pdf 
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The operation procedures should be strictly defined covering at least: 
 The roles and responsibilities of the accountable personnel234;  
 The type of the incident for ensuring interaction with relative legislation (e.g. the 
communication with the data protection authorities in case of incidents resulting 
in personal data breaches235); 
 The identification of documented information required alongside with the pur-
pose of requesting it236; 
 The frequency of the audits alongside with its preventive objectives 237;  
 The dedicated communication channels between the relative entities; and, 
 The provision of a documented report based on the evidence found through the 
assessment of the implemented security measures238. 
The documented report should underpin the level of compliance239 for OESs’ side 
(compliant-partial compliant –non-compliant); in case of partial or non-compliant 
national competent authority should provide a report with evidence integrated by 
binding instructions for OESs in order to correct or complete the missing items240. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 Article 15(1). 
235 Article 15(4). Cf. Cormack, Andrew, Incident Response: Protecting Individual Rights Under the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation, SCRIPTED A Journal of Law, Technology & Society 2016, pp. 259-
282. 
236 Article 15(2). 
237 Article 15(1)(2). 
238 By reviewing relative documents including descriptions of: i) policies, roles and responsibilities; ii) 
processes and procedures; iii) systems architecture and design; iv) test procedures and actual test results. 
239 Based on the guidance instructions by the Cooperation Group for setting the requirements for opera-
tors of essential services in accordance with article 14 of the NIS Directive. 
240 Article 15(3). 
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2.6 Security requirements for Digital Service 
Providers (DSPs) 
According to the directive the term “digital service”241 refers to the service provided 
under the following conditions242: 
1. from a distance and by using electronic means; 
2. at the request of the person concerned, to receive the service; 
3. against remuneration. 
The Digital Service Provider is defined as any legal person that provides a digital ser-
vice. So, a natural person may not be considered as DSP. According to Recital 50,” 
hardware manufacturers and software developers” are not digital service providers243. 
 The NIS Directive does not require from the Member States to identify244 which DSPs 
should be set under its scope; on the contrary, it defines certain categories of DSPs.  
 
I. The online marketplace 
Article 4 (17) of NIS Directive defines online marketplaces as services that “allow con-
sumers and traders to conclude online sales or service contracts with traders and is the 
final destination for the conclusion of those contracts”245. Intermediaries and price com-
parison services are excluded246. 
So, with the term online market service provider the Directive refers to the services that 
facilitate the economic activity of an entity with the use of electronic means247, such 
as248: 
 The state of processing transactions and aggregation of information regarding 
buyers, suppliers and products;  
 The provision of a searching facility for appropriate products; 
 The provision of products;  
 The provision of special knowledge of transactions; and, 
                                                 
241 Article 4(5). 
242 The legal definition according to EU 2015/1535, article 1(1)(b).  
243 See also Holzleitner/Reichl, European provisions for cyber security in smart grid – an overview of the 
NIS-directive, Elektrotechnik & Informationstechnik 2017, p. 16.  
14-18 
244 Due to the cross-border nature of DSPs, recital 57. 
245 Definition of online marketplace, article 4(17). 
246 Recital 15. 
247 ICT technology. 
248 Recital 15. 
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 The provision of a matching capability between buyers and sellers249. 
 
II. The online search engine provider. 
This type of provider allows users to search on all websites, independent on content and 
language. There is an exception, however, that provided services relating with search 
and price comparisons are excluded250. 
 
III. The cloud computing service provider 
Article 4 (19) of the NIS Directive defines cloud computing service as meaning “a digi-
tal service that enables access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing re-
sources”251. The principle of service operation is the state that many computer users can 
use the same physical infrastructure - the so-called common resources - to process data 
on demand. These shared resources refer to any kind of hardware or software (e.g. net-
works, servers or other infrastructure, storage, applications and services). The computa-
tional resource can be expanded or reduced at any time, depending on the requirements 
of the users with automatic way, so that the resources always match as much as possible 
with current demand252. 
In accordance with the above mentioned, the following three main types of cloud com-
puting provided are covered by the NIS Directive and are illustrated in picture 8:  
 "Infrastructure as a Service”253 (IaaS): 
 “Platform as a Service”254 (PaaS):  
 “Software as a service”255 (SaaS):  
 
 
                                                 
249  COM (2017) 476 final, page 32. 
250 Article 4(18) and recital 16. 
251 For specific legal aspects of cloud security see e.g. Kemp, Legal aspects of cloud security, Computer 
Law and Security Review, 2018, pp. 22 et seq.  
252 Article 4(19) and recital 17. 
253 It provides virtual enterprise infrastructure in the form of hardware, networking and storage devices, 
for enabling businesses perform their daily operations; COM (2017) 476 final, p.33. 
254 It allows the companies to run either applications that already exist or to test new applications; Making 
the most of NIS, COM (2017) 476 final, p. 33. 
255 It is an application or software that allows the user to use it at any time and from any device via the 
Internet. It is not required to purchase the product in question for the user to use it; COM (2017) 476 fi-
nal, p. 33. 
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Picture 8: Service models and assets in cloud computing256. 
 
2.6.1  Technical and organizational requirements for DSPs 
The NIS Directive stresses that the Member States must ensure that digital service pro-
viders identify and take appropriate and proportionate technical and organizational 
measures to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems 
which they use in the context of offering services within the Union. “Having regard to 
the state-of-the-art, those measures shall ensure a level of security of network and in-
formation systems appropriate to the risk posed, and shall consider the following ele-
ments257: 
(a) the security of systems and facilities; 
(b) incident handling; 
(c) business continuity management; 
(d) monitoring, auditing and testing; 
(e) compliance with international standards”. 
 
                                                 
256Making the most of NIS, COM (2017) 476 final Annex 1, p. 34. 
257 Article 16 (1) NIS Directive. 
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2.6.2 Sophistication level of measures 
Although the risk of cyber challenges may be considered relatively new in the security 
area, the frantic spread of the risk with the parallel development of the technology on a 
fast spreading rate makes the choice for appropriate measures critical. 
The EU understands that cybersecurity technology tools are developed in such a way to 
promote the growth of the digital economy. 
On the other hand, they are also used to protect our security, our society and our democ-
racy. Therefore, the EU considers the cybersecurity of the information systems as the 
highest strategic interest for the Union258. 
The information systems security refers to processes and methodologies mandatory for 
protecting both the system and the individual parts,259 concerning the four basic security 
principles/requirements: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. The es-
tablished processes are implemented by the organizations for managing security issues; 
therefore, these can be considered as a part of an organization’s information manage-
ment system.   
The effectiveness of the measures depends largely on the extent on the design accuracy 
which involves: 
 identification and monitoring; 
 evaluation and comparison (testing); and 
 communicating and reporting.  
In accordance with the Directive’s requirements, the designing process of the imple-
mented information security measures should mandatorily include the state-of-the-art 
sophistication level which includes: 
 continuous monitoring of implementation; and,  
 structural review of implementation, taking into consideration changes, inci-
dents, tests and exercises, to proactively improve the implementation of security 
measures.  
 
                                                 
258Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, available at: 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf>   
259 An information system is consisted of: humans, software, hardware, processes and data. 
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2.6.3 Security objectives for DSPs 
The DSPs are required to prepare an Information Security Management System focused 
on clearly defined: 
 strategic objectives; 
 the ways, and 
 the means, 
 through which the objectives could be accomplished.  Pursuant to article 16(8) of NIS 
Directive, ENISA has prepared260 a set of non-binding guidelines261, to support and as-
sist the DSPs in understanding, what should be included into their action framework 
during their effort to comply with the NIS Directive, regarding the technical and organi-
zation measures, as required in article 16(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
260ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, Decem-
ber 2016, available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/minimum-security-measures-for-digital-
service-providers 
261The study was carried out by ENISA for the Commission’s interest. 
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Table 3: Common security objectives for the three categories of DSPs262. 
 
 
 
 It is worth mentioning that according to the Technical guidelines for the implementa-
tion of minimum security measures for DSPs, all 27 identified security objectives have 
been derived from a set of commonly used standards263, by DSPs in the EU’s electronic 
communication sector. 
                                                 
262ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, pp. 55-
56  
263 International and national standards. 
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 So, in accordance with table 3 the identified common security objectives264 for all 
DSPs265 is to achieve a minimum common level of resistance within EU, and are as fol-
lows: 
 
SO. 01:Information security policy 
An information security policy should be established and maintained by the digital ser-
vice providers, aligned with business objectives, to address the security and continuity 
of the communication networks and the services provided.  
In table 4 we may see examples of security measures grouped in 3 different sophistica-
tion levels: basic (level 1), industry (level 2) and state-of-the-art (level 3). The levels are 
cumulative. As it is expected, the next level encompasses the security requirements of 
the previous level. 
Table 4: Security measures for ensuring the Information security policy266. 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 
 Set a high-level security policy, which is aligned 
with business objectives and addresses the securi-
ty and continuity of the communication net-
works8 and/or services provided.  
 Make key personnel aware of the security policy.  
 
 Documented security policy, 
including networks, systems 
and services in scope, critical 
assets supporting them, and 
the security objectives.  
 Key personnel are aware of 
the security policy and its ob-
jectives (interview).  
 
 
2 
 
 Set detailed information security policies for criti-
cal assets and business processes.  
 Make all personnel aware of the security policy 
and what it entails for their work.  
 Review the security policy following incidents.  
 
 Documented information se-
curity policy, approved by 
management, including appli-
cable laws and regulations, ac-
cessible to personnel.  
 The information security policy 
is easily accessible to staff.  
 Personnel is aware of the in-
formation security policy and 
what it implies for their work 
(interview).  
 Review comments or change 
logs for the policy.  
 
 
 
 Review the information security policies periodi-
cally, and take into account significant system 
changes, violations, exceptions, past incidents, 
past tests/exercises, and incidents affecting other 
 Information security policies 
are up to date and approved 
by senior management.  
 Logs of policy exceptions, ap-
                                                 
264 These are marked with a check mark. 
265 Included in Annex III. 
266 ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, p. 12. 
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3 (similar) providers in the sector  
 
proved by the relevant roles. 
 Documentation of the review 
process, taking into account 
changes and past incidents.  
o Last planned review 
has been done 
according to to the 
review process.  
o Records of the man-
agement review.  
o Meeting minutes of 
review sessions.  
o Feeds and insights 
collected from inter-
nal security solutions 
and external data-
bases  
 
 
SO. 02: Risk management  
A Risk Management policy should be established and maintained from the digital ser-
vice providers for addressing the cybersecurity challenges to prevent, respond and miti-
gate the negative impact on their provided services. Although the Directive does not in-
dicate the practical way that should be followed by the providers, however, it introduces 
the theoretical base of the risk management accountabilities and methodologies de-
signed to meet strategy’s requirements.  
  
  Picture 9: Components of risk management process 267. 
                                                 
267 Whitman/Mattord, Principles of Information Security, 4th edition 2012, p. 120. 
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 A risk management approach should consist of three stages, as it is presented in picture 
9: 
a. Risk identification; 
b. Risk assessment;  
c. Risk control.  
 
a. Risk identification: during this process the relative stakeholders are invited to 
identify which parts of the information systems and services are critical to being 
protected, by considering the existing security measures, to finally produce a list of 
threats for each critical asset. Additionally, they should set up a procedure that eval-
uates the value of assets that can be either tangible or intangible. 
b. Risk assessment: the stakeholders should correlate any existing vulnerability 
to each critical identified asset268 in order to evaluate the risk level269 of each identi-
fied threat. This process will help the company to understand the level of its 
preparedness270 while preserving it as a point of reference for imposing each time 
appropriate security measures. This process should be repetitive271 in order to be 
able to adapt to the needs that arise. 
c. Risk control: this is the time to choose the appropriate and proportionate se-
curity mechanisms for addressing the challenges272. These security mechanisms 
should have the nature of prevention, response and mitigation of the impact. 
In table 5 examples of security measures are given. 
Table 5: Security measures for ensuring Risk management273. 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
 
1 
 Create a list of the main risks for security and 
continuity of the provided communication net-
works, systems or services, considering the main 
threats for critical assets.  
 Consider risks which stem from data protection 
or other sector-specific regulations or policies 
into the risk assessments.  
 Make key personnel aware of the main risks and 
 List of main risks described 
at a high level, including the 
underlying threat(s) and 
their potential impact on 
the security, continuity and 
privacy of networks and 
services.  
 Key personnel are aware of 
                                                 
268“Classify and prioritize assets”, during Risk Identification stage. 
269 The possibility the threat to cause damage. It is usually evaluated as: high, minimum, low. 
270 Article 16(1)(a). 
271 Article 16(1)(d). 
272 Article 16(1)(b). 
273 ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, p. 14. 
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how they are mitigated.  
 
the main risks (via inter-
views, ad hoc tests).  
 
 
 
2 
 Set up a risk management methodology and/or 
tools based on industry standards.  
 Ensure that key personnel use risk management 
methodology and tools.  
 Review the risk assessments following changes, 
security incidents or data breaches.  
 Ensure residual risks are accepted by manage-
ment.  
 
 Documented risk manage-
ment methodology and/or 
tools which contains, at 
least:  
o Objectives, roles, and 
responsibilities;  
o The scope of the risk 
management method-
ology;  
o Procedures that 
support the risk as-
sessment;  
o Catastrophic but im-
probable events that 
could affect the offered 
services.  
 Guidance for personnel on 
assessing risks.  
 List of risks and evidence of 
updates/reviews.  
 Review comments or 
change logs for risk assess-
ments.  
 Management approval of 
residual risks.  
 
 
3 
 Review the risk management methodology 
and/or tools, periodically, taking into account 
changes and past incidents  
 
 Documentation of the re-
view process and updates of 
the risk management meth-
odology and/or tools.  
o Last planned review has 
been done according to 
to the review process.  
o Records of the man-
agement review.  
o Meeting minutes of re-
view sessions  
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SO. 03: Security Roles  
The DSPs should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the designated person-
nel274, complemented by specified processes.  
In table 6 some examples of security measures are given. 
Table 6: Security measures for defining security roles275 
LEV
EL 
SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Assign security 
roles and respon-
sibilities to per-
sonnel.  
 Make sure the 
security roles are 
reachable in case 
of security inci-
dents.  
 
 
 List of security roles (CISO, DPO, business continuity 
manager, etc.), who occupy them and contact in-
formation.  
 
 
2 
 
 Personnel is formally appointed 
in security roles  
 Make personnel aware of the 
security roles in your organiza-
tion and when they should be 
contacted  
 
 
 List of appointments (CISO, DPO, etc.), and descrip-
tion of responsibilities and tasks for security roles 
(CISO, DPO, etc.).  
 Formal appointment of the key security roles and 
responsibilities.  
 Awareness/dissemination material for personnel 
explaining security roles and when/how they should 
be contacted.  
 
 
3 
 Structure of security roles and 
responsibilities is regularly re-
viewed and revised, based on 
changes and/or past incidents  
 
 Up-to-date documentation of the structure of secu-
rity role assignments and responsibilities.  
  Documentation of the review process, taking into 
account changes and past incidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
274 E.g. CSO, CISO, CTO etc. 
275 ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, p. 16. 
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SO. 04: Third party management276. 
The DSPs are required to establish and maintain a documented security policy, for en-
suring that third parties are trained and aware of security issues277. The objective of this 
policy is to ensure that all procurement of services/products from third parties278 are 
provided as they should be in accordance with the relative policy objective. 
In table 7 examples of some security measures are given. 
Table 7: Security measures within sophistication levels279. 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 Contractual agreements when dealing with third 
parties and customers have been established.  
 Include security requirements and relevant tasks in 
contracts with third-parties and customers.  
 Communicate residual risks which might affect the 
offered services to the customers.  
 Retain the right to perform second party audits 
where it is deemed necessary from a risk perspec-
tive.  
 Responsibilities regarding the maintenance, opera-
tion and owner-ship of assets have been defined  
 
 List of relevant third-party 
contracts.  
 List of a customer access 
request.  
 Identify selection criteria.  
 Documented contractual 
agreements containing at 
least:  
o Service description;  
o Security measures;  
o Non-disclosure agree-
ments;  
 
o Roles and responsibilities;  
o Target service levels;  
o Contacts and reporting 
lines;  
o The right for second party 
audits.  
 Explicit security require-
ments in the contracts with 
third parties supplying IT 
products, IT services, out-
sourced business processes, 
helpdesks, call centres, in-
terconnections, shared fa-
cilities, et cetera.  
 
 
2 
 Set a security policy for contracts with third-parties.  
 Ensure that all procurement of services/products 
from third-parties follows the policy.  
 Review security policy for third parties, following 
incidents or changes.  
 Documented security policy 
for contracts with third par-
ties.  
 Contracts for third-party 
services contain security 
requirements, in line with 
                                                 
276 Article 16(5). 
277This is a Security measure within sophistication level 1 for “security knowledge and training objec-
tive”, according to the above-mentioned “Technical Guidelines for the implementation of minimum secu-
rity measures for Digital Service Providers”, p. 20. 
278There is an inventory of third-parties stakeholders identified in the relative policy. 
279 Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs”, p. 17. 
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 Perform risk analysis before entering any outsourc-
ing agreement.  
 Mitigate residual risks that are not addressed by the 
third party.  
 
the security policy for pro-
curement.  
 Past risk analysis reports.  
 Residual risks resulting from 
dependencies on third par-
ties are listed and mitigat-
ed.  
 Documented third parties’ 
contractual agreements 
contain special require-
ments in case of:  
o Major blackouts;  
o Natural catastrophes;  
o Accidents or other possi-
ble emergency situations;  
o Blackout resistance.  
 
 
3 
 
 Keep track of security incidents related to or caused 
by third-parties.  
 Periodically review and update policy for third par-
ties and reevaluate outsourcing agreements at regu-
lar intervals, taking into account past incidents, 
changes, etc.  
 
 List of security incidents 
related to or caused by en-
gagement with third-
parties.  
 Documented results of 
monitoring activities.  
 Documented results of au-
diting activities.  
 Identify the process(es) 
applied to manage recent 
changes and confirm:  
o Adequate warning to 
all stakeholders is pro-
vided;  
o Involves relevant per-
sonnel;  
o Includes procedures for 
backing-out from failed 
changes.  
 
 
 
 
SO. 05: Background checks. 
The organization’s security policy will authorize the DSP to perform appropriate back-
ground checks for staff prior to recruitment, if necessary, for their duties and responsi-
bilities, with clearly defined procedures for providing relative information. 
In table 8 examples of security measures are given. 
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Table 8: Security measures within sophistication levels280. 
LEVE
L 
SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
1  Check professional references of key personnel (system 
administrators, security officers, guards, et cetera).  
 
 Documentation of checks of 
professional references for 
key personnel.  
 
 
 
2 
 Perform background checks/screening for key personnel 
and external contractors, when needed and legally 
permitted.  
 Set up a policy and procedure for background checks.  
 Individuals screening criteria is established and reviewed 
for the organization’s position  
 
 Policy and procedure for 
background 
checks/screenings. Guidance 
for personnel about 
when/how to perform back-
ground checks/screenings.  
 Screening records containing 
at least:  
o Employment history;  
o Verification of the high-
est education degree re-
ceived;  
o Residency;  
o Law enforcement 
records.  
 
 
3 
 Review and update policy/procedures for background 
checks and reference checks at regular intervals, taking in-
to account changes and past incidents. 
 The screening process is in line with the defined policies 
and regulations.  
 Individuals are rescreened based on a defined list of con-
ditions.  
 
 Review comments or change 
logs of the policy/procedures. 
 Documented screening 
requirements.  
 Records of the rescreening 
process.  
 
 
SO.06: Security knowledge and training 
It is required by the DSP to verify and ensure that personnel are efficiently qualified and 
participate in regular security training.  
In table 9 examples of security measures are given.  
Table 9: Security measures within sophistication levels281 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Regularly provide key personnel with relevant train-
ing and material on security issues.  
 Ensure that third parties are trained and aware of 
security issues  
 Key personnel has followed 
security training and has 
sufficient security 
knowledge (interview).  
 Third parties have sufficient 
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 security knowledge (inter-
view).  
 
 
2 
 Implement a program for training, making sure that 
key personnel have sufficient and up-to-date securi-
ty knowledge.  
 The program is approved by the management.  
 Organize training and awareness sessions for per-
sonnel on security topics important for the organiza-
tion.  
 
 Personnel have participated 
in awareness sessions on 
security topics.  
 Documented program for 
training on security skills, 
including, objectives for dif-
ferent roles and how to 
reach it (by e.g. training, 
awareness raising, etc.).  
 Records of individual 
awareness activities  
 
 
 
3 
 Contents of security training are based on assigned 
roles and responsibilities and specific requirements 
of the organization and the information system to 
which personnel have authorized access.  
 Review and update the training program periodical-
ly, taking into account changes and past incidents.  
 Test the security knowledge of personnel.  
 Contacts and communication channels with security 
groups and associations have been established in 
order to stay up to date with the latest recom-
mended security practices, techniques, and tech-
nologies.  
 Provide to the organization personnel training ses-
sions to obtain recognized security certifications  
 
 Updated security aware-
ness and training program.  
 The last planned review has 
been done according to to 
the review process.  
 Meeting minutes of review 
sessions.  
 List of contacts with securi-
ty groups and associations.  
 Results of tests of the secu-
rity knowledge of person-
nel.  
 Review comments or 
change logs for the pro-
gram.  
 Results of the individual 
certification process.  
 
 
 
 
 
SO. 07: Personnel changes process 
The organization’s security policy should include this process clearly defined and doc-
umented for addressing the changes in: 
 Personnel, or/and, 
 their roles and responsibilities. 
In table 10 examples of such security measures are given. 
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Table 10: Security measures within sophistication levels282. 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Following changes in personnel revoke access 
rights, badges, equipment, et cetera, if no longer 
necessary or permitted. Brief and educate new per-
sonnel on the policies and procedures in place.  
 
 Evidence that personnel 
changes have been fol-
lowed up with revocation of 
access rights, badges, 
equipment, et cetera  
  Evidence that new person-
nel has been briefed and 
educated about policies and 
procedures in place.  
 
 
2 
 Implement policy/procedures for personnel chang-
es, taking into account timely revocation access 
rights, badges, equipment.  
 Implement policy/procedures for education and 
training for personnel in new roles  
 
 Documentation of process 
for personnel changes, in-
cluding, responsibilities for 
managing changes, descrip-
tion of rights of access and 
possession of assets per 
role, procedures for briefing 
and training personnel in 
new roles  
 Evidence that personnel 
changes have been carried 
out according to the pro-
cess and that access rights 
have been updated timely 
(e.g. checklists).  
 
 
3 
 Periodically check that the policy/procedures are 
effective.  
 Review and evaluate policy/procedures for person-
nel changes, taking into account changes or past in-
cidents.  
 Automated process review access permissions that 
are initiated by personnel changes.  
 
 Evidence of checks of ac-
cess rights etc. Up to date 
policy/procedures for man-
aging personnel changes.  
 Review comments or 
change logs.  
 Proof of automated 
process.  
 
 
 
SO.08: Physical and environmental security  
The security policy should address physical and environmental threats for protecting the 
datacenters of the digital service providers, by implementing security controls such as 
physical access controls, alarm systems and environmental controls etc. 
In table 11 examples of security measures are given. 
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Table 11: Security measures within sophistication levels283. 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Prevent unauthorized physical access to facilities 
and infrastructure and set up environmental con-
trols, to protect against unauthorized access, bur-
glary, fire, flooding, etc.  
 A list of personnel with authorized access to facili-
ties containing information systems and appropri-
ate authorization credentials (e.g., badges, identifi-
cation cards) is maintained by the organization.  
 Visitors are authenticated before authorizing access 
to the facility.  
 Data centre environmental conditions (e.g., water, 
power, temperature and humidity controls) shall be 
secured, monitored, maintained, and tested to en-
sure protection from unauthorized interception or 
damage.  
 
 Basic implementation of 
physical security measures 
and environmental controls, 
such as door and cabinet 
locks, burglar alarm, fire 
alarms, fire extinguishers, 
CCTVs, et cetera.  
 List of personnel with au-
thorized access.  
 List of authorized visitors.  
 Basic implementation of en-
vironmental controls.  
 
 
 
2 
 Implement a policy for physical security measures 
and environmental controls.  
 Document procedure for emergency cases  
 A designated official within the organization to re-
view and approve the list of personnel with author-
ized access has been identified.  
 Visitors are escorted as required according to secu-
rity policies and procedures.  
 Visitor’s access records to the facility are main-
tained by the organization.  
 Physical access to the premises is monitored by the 
organization.  
 Industry standard implementation of physical and 
environmental controls.  
 
 Documented policy for phys-
ical security measures and 
environmental controls, in-
cluding a description of facil-
ities and systems in scope.  
 Documented procedure with 
the specific steps to take in 
case of emergency.  
 Physical and environmental 
controls, like electronic con-
trol of entrance and audit 
trail, segmentation of spaces 
according to authorization 
levels, automated fire extin-
guishers with halocarbon 
gases, et cetera.  
 Records of visitors’ access to 
the facility.  
 Documented description of 
monitoring equipment.  
 
 
3 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of physical and environ-
mental controls periodically. 
 Review and update the policy for physical security 
measures and environmental controls taking into 
account changes and past incidents.  
 Physical access records are kept and stored in case 
of an audit or investigation.  
 Physical access records are retained as dictated by 
applicable regulations or based on an organization-
defined period by approved policy.  
 Up to date policy for physical 
security measures and envi-
ronmental controls.  
 Documentation about the 
evaluation of environmental 
control, review comments or 
change logs.  
 Proof of different versions of 
physical access records.  
 Documented defined period 
of retention.  
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 Separate facilities into different zones according to 
their contents.  
 
 List with different access 
zones.  
 
 
 
SO.9: Security of supporting utilities  
Additionally, specified security measures should be imposed for ensuring the security of 
the supporting utilities (e.g. electricity). Examples of security mechanisms are given in 
table 12. 
Table 12: Security measures within sophistication levels284 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
1  Ensure security of supplies, such as electric power, 
fuel or HVC.  
 
 Security of supplies is pro-
tected in a basic way, for 
example, backup power 
and/or backup fuel is availa-
ble  
 
 
2 
 Implement a policy for the security of critical sup-
plies, such as electrical power, fuel, etc.  
 Implement industry standard security measures to 
protect supplies and supporting facilities.  
 
 Documented policy to pro-
tect critical supplies such as 
electrical power, fuel, etc., 
describing different types of 
supplies, and the security 
measures protecting the 
supplies.  
 Evidence of industry stand-
ard measures to protect the 
security of supplies, such as 
for example, passive cooling, 
automatic restart after a 
power interruption, battery 
backup power, diesel gener-
ators, backup fuel, etc.  
 
 
3 
 Advanced security measures to protect supplies.  
 Review and update policy and procedures to secure 
supplies regularly, taking into account changes and 
past incidents.  
 
 Advanced implementation 
controls to protect the 
security of supplies, such as 
active cooling, UP, hot 
standby power generators, 
sufficient fuel delivery SLA, 
SLAs with fuel delivery com-
panies, redundant cooling 
and power backup systems.  
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SO.10: Access control to network and information system 
The establishment and maintenance of appropriate policies and measures for controlling 
the access to business resources are required for DSPs and some examples of them are 
given in table 13. 
Table13: Security measures within sophistication levels285 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Users and systems have unique ID’s and are authen-
ticated before accessing services or systems.  
 Implement (logical) access control mechanism for 
network and information systems to allow only au-
thorized use.  
 
 Access logs show unique 
identifiers for users and sys-
tems when granting or de-
nied access.  
 Overview of authentication 
and access control methods 
for systems and users.  
 Documented methods of 
access control containing at 
least:  
o Authentication type;  
o Authorization schema.  
 
 
 
2 
 Implement policy for protecting access to network 
and information systems, addressing for example 
roles, rights, responsibilities and procedures for as-
signing and revoking access rights.  
 Based on the results of risk analysis, choose the rel-
evant authentication mechanisms which are 
deemed relevant to different types of access.  
 Monitor access to the network and information sys-
tems, have a process for approving exceptions and 
registering access violations.  
 Security functions are restricted to the least amount 
of users necessary to ensure the security of the in-
formation system.  
 Track and monitor privileged accounts by validating 
their creation, use of specific authentication meth-
ods and regular reviews.  
 Segment information access within network and 
information systems based on security require-
ments  
 
 Access control policy includ-
ing a description of roles, 
groups, access rights, proce-
dures for granting and revok-
ing access.  
 Different types of authenti-
cation mechanisms for dif-
ferent types of access, e.g. 
Single-Sign-On, two-factor 
authentication, multi-factor 
authentication, etc, (includ-
ing remote and WiFi mecha-
nisms)  
 Log of access control policy 
violations and exceptions, 
approved by the security of-
ficer.  
 List of authorized users who 
can access to security func-
tions.  
  Logs from privileged ac-
counts’ usage.  
 Network isolation and im-
plementation of segmented 
network security zones that 
limit the impact of a malware 
incident  
                                                 
285 ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, p. 27. 
 
 
  -73- 
 Segregation of duties control 
matrix.  
 Access control matrix.  
 
 
 
3 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of access control policies 
and procedures and implement cross checks on ac-
cess control mechanisms.  
  Access control policy and access control mecha-
nisms are reviewed and when needed to be revised.  
 Restrictions in the number of concurrent sessions 
are defined and implemented by the organization.  
 
 Reports of (security) tests of 
access control mechanisms  
 Tools for detection of anom-
alous usage of systems or an 
anomalous behaviour of sys-
tems (such as intrusion de-
tection/prevention and 
anomaly detection systems).  
 Logs of intrusion detec-
tion10/prevention and 
anomaly detection systems.  
 Updates of the access con-
trol policy, review comments 
or change logs.  
 Real-time logging and re-
cording of unsuccessful login 
attempts;  
 Real-time alerting when the 
number of defined consecu-
tive invalid access attempts 
is exceeded.  
 
 
 
SO.11: Integrity of network components and information systems 
 
The implementation of specific technology and operational measures for protection 
from malware threats responsible for altering either the functionality of the systems or 
the integrity or accessibility of the same information are required and some examples of 
such security measures are included in table 14. 
Table 14: Security measures within sophistication levels286 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
 
1 
 Make sure software of network and information 
systems is not tampered with or altered, for in-
stance by using input controls.  
 Protect security-critical data (like passwords, shared 
secrets, private keys, etc.) from being disclosed or 
tampered with. 
 Take measures against malicious software on (inter-
nal) network and information systems.  
 
 Software and data in net-
work and information sys-
tems are protected using 
prevention, input controls, 
firewalls, encryption and 
signing.  
 Security-critical data is pro-
tected using protection 
mechanisms like separate 
storage, encryption, hashing, 
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etc.  
 Malware detection systems 
are present, and up to date.  
 Records of recent updates of 
malware protection mecha-
nisms.  
 Records of periodical scans.  
 
 
 
 
2 
 Implement industry standard security measures, 
providing defence-in-depth and protection against 
tampering and altering of systems.  
  The malware protection mechanisms are centrally 
managed.  
 There are mechanisms which prevent users from 
circumventing malware protection capabilities.  
 Spam protection mechanisms are employed at sys-
tem entry points such as workstations, servers, or 
mobile computing devices on the network.  
 
 Documentation about how 
the protection of software 
and data in network and in-
formation system is imple-
mented.  
 Documented alternative 
countermeasures such as:  
o Securing of all physical 
and logical data inter-
faces;  
o Network isolation and 
implementation of seg-
mented network securi-
ty zones that limit the 
impact of a malware in-
cident;  
o Comprehensive system 
hardening measures to 
minimize the risk of 
malware incidents.  
 Tools for detection of anom-
alous usage of systems or an 
anomalous behaviour of sys-
tems (such as intrusion de-
tection/prevention and 
anomaly detection systems).  
 Logs of intrusion detec-
tion/prevention and anoma-
ly detection systems.  
 Documented description of 
centrally management tools.  
 Documented spam 
protection mechanism.  
 Use of whitelisting solutions, 
which restrict the execution 
of non-approved software 
and code.  
 Interactive access to critical 
systems is performed using 
hardened hosts which have 
built-in controls to inhibit 
phishing attacks, lateral 
movement, and persistent 
compromise.  
 
3  Sophisticated controls to protect the integrity of  Sophisticated controls to 
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systems.  
 Evaluate and review the effectiveness of measures 
to protect the integrity of systems.  
 
protect the integrity of sys-
tems, such as code signing, 
tripwire, et cetera.  
 Documentation of the 
process for checking logs of 
anomaly and intrusion de-
tection/prevention systems.  
 
 
 
SO.12: Operating procedures 
These procedures are responsible for the efficient and effective way of operating the key 
network and information systems by personnel. Examples of security measures are giv-
en in table 15. 
Table 15: Security measures within sophistication levels287 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Set up operational procedures and assign responsi-
bilities for the operation of critical systems.  
 
 Documentation of opera-
tional procedures and re-
sponsibilities for key net-
work and information sys-
tems.  
 
 
2 
 Implement a policy for the operation of systems to 
make sure all critical systems are operated and man-
aged in line with predefined procedures.  
 
 Documented policy for the 
operation of critical sys-
tems, including an overview 
of network and information 
systems in scope.  
 
 
3 
 Review and update the policy/procedures for the 
operation of critical systems, taking into account in-
cidents and/or changes.  
 
 Updated policy/procedures 
for critical systems, review 
comments and/or change 
logs.  
 
 
 
SO.13: Change management procedures 
These procedures are addressing key network and information systems changes (e.g. 
change and configuration procedures and processes). Examples of security measures are 
given in table 16. 
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Table 16: Security measures within sophistication levels288 
 
1 
 Follow predefined procedures when making changes to 
critical systems, according to licensing agreements  
 Inform the customer of significant changes to critical 
systems which affect the offered services.  
 
 Documentation of change 
management procedures for 
critical systems.  
 Documentation of a custom-
er update on significant 
changes  
 
 
2 
 Implement and test policy/procedures for change man-
agement, to make sure that changes in critical systems 
are always done following a predefined way.  
 Document change management procedures, and rec-
ord for each change the steps of the followed proce-
dure.  
 
 Documentation of change 
management poli-
cy/procedures including, sys-
tems subject to the policy, 
objectives, rollback proce-
dures, etc.  
 For each change, a report is 
available describing the steps 
and the result of the change  
 
3  Review and update change management procedures 
regularly, taking into account changes and past inci-
dents.  
 
 Up to date change manage-
ment procedures, review 
comments and/or change 
logs.  
 
 
 
SO.14: Asset management procedures 
These procedures manage the assets under protection and the configuration controls for 
key network and information systems. Examples of security measures are given in table 
17. 
Table 17: Security measures within sophistication levels289 
 
 
1 
 A secure baseline configuration of components and 
information systems is developed, documented and 
maintained.  
 Manage critical assets e.g. software, hardware, infor-
mation and configurations of critical systems.  
 
 Documented secure baseline 
configuration containing at 
least:  
o Essential capabilities of 
operation;  
o Restricted use of func-
tions;  
o Security by default;  
o Ports, protocols and/or 
services allowed.  
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 List of critical assets and crit-
ical systems.  
 
 
2 
 Implement policy/procedures for asset management 
and configuration control.  
 
 Documented poli-
cy/procedures for asset 
management, including roles 
and responsibilities, the as-
sets and configurations that 
are subject to the policy, the 
objectives of asset manage-
ment  
 An asset inventory or inven-
tories, containing critical as-
sets, their owners and the 
dependency between assets.  
 A configuration control in-
ventory or inventories, con-
taining configurations of crit-
ical systems.  
 
 
3 
 
 Review and update the asset management policy regu-
larly, based on changes and past incidents.  
 Review regularly the list with configurations and the list 
with critical assets based, based on changes and past 
incidents.  
 A secure baseline configuration for development and 
test environments is managed separately from the op-
erational baseline configuration.  
 
 Up to date asset manage-
ment policy/procedures, re-
view comments and/or 
change logs.  
 Documented results of the 
review activities.  
 Documented and approved 
exceptions to the configura-
tion baseline containing the 
alternative controls in place 
to ensure the confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of 
the information system.  
 Documented secure baseline 
configuration for develop-
ment and test environments.  
 
 
 
 
 
SO.15: Security incident detection & Response procedures 
These procedures are addressing the detection and response to security incidents appro-
priately and should promote the mitigation, recovery and remediation from a security 
incident providing also an educational indicator. Examples of security measures are 
given in table 18. 
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Table 18: Security measures within sophistication levels290 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Set up processes or systems for incident detection 
and response.  
 Make sure personnel is available and prepared to 
manage and handle incidents.  
 
 Past incidents were detect-
ed and timely forwarded to 
the appropriate people, in-
cluding customers.  
 Personnel is aware of how 
to deal with incidents and 
when to escalate.  
 Inventory of major incidents 
and per incident, impact, 
cause, actions taken, and 
lessons learnt.  
 
 
 
2 
 Implement industry standard systems and proce-
dures for incident detection and response.  
 Implement systems and procedures for registering 
and forwarding incidents timely to the appropriate 
people.  
 
 Incident detection systems 
and procedures, such as Se-
curity Incident and Event 
Management (SIEM) tools, 
security helpdesk for per-
sonnel and customers, re-
ports and advisories from 
Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Teams (CERTs), tools 
to spot anomalies, et cetera.  
 Policy/procedures for inci-
dent detection and re-
sponse, including, types of 
incidents that could occur, 
objectives, roles and re-
sponsibilities, detailed de-
scription, per incident type, 
how to manage the inci-
dent, when to escalate to 
senior management (CISO 
e.g.), et cetera.  
 Management commitment 
to the incident response 
program.  
 Records of individual train-
ing activities.  
 Description of the incident 
handling capability contain-
ing at least the following 
procedures:  
o Preparation;  
o Detection;  
o Analysis;  
o Containment;  
o Mitigation;  
o Recovery.  
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3 
 Investigate major incidents and draft final incident 
reports, including actions taken and recommenda-
tions to mitigate and reduce time to react to any fu-
ture occurrence of this type of incident or data 
breach.  
 Review systems and processes for incident detec-
tion and response regularly and update them taking 
into account changes and past incidents.  
 Regular cyber exercises and related results to test 
the incident response effectiveness are scheduled 
and documented.  
 
 Individual reports of the 
handling of major incidents.  
 Up to date documentation 
of incident detection and 
response systems and pro-
cesses.  
 Documentation of review of 
the incident detection and 
response processes, maxi-
mum response times, re-
view comments, and/or 
change logs.  
 Records of cyber exercises.  
 
 
SO.16: Security incident reporting procedures 
The DSPs should define these procedures for communicating the security incidents. Ex-
amples of such type of security measures are given in table 19. 
Table 19: Security measures within sophistication levels291 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Communicate and report about on-going or past 
incidents to third parties, customers, and/or gov-
ernment authorities, when necessary.  
 
 Communicate and report 
about on-going or past inci-
dents to third parties, cus-
tomers, and/or government 
authorities, when necessary.  
 
 
2 
 
 Implement policy and procedures for communicating 
and reporting about incidents.  
 
 Documented policy and 
procedures for communi-
cating and reporting about 
incidents, describing rea-
sons/motivations for com-
municating or reporting 
(business reasons, legal rea-
sons etc.), the type of inci-
dents in scope, the required 
content of communications, 
notifications or reports, the 
channels to be used, and 
the roles responsible for 
communicating, notifying 
and reporting.  
 Templates for incident re-
porting and communication.  
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  Evaluate past communications and reporting about 
incidents.  
  Review and update the reporting and communica-
tion plans, based on changes or past incidents.  
 
 List of incident reports and 
past communications about 
incidents  
 Up to date incident re-
sponse and communication 
policy, review comments, 
and/or change logs.  
 
 
SO.17: Business continuity 
The business continuity plan ensures the continuity of the services offered. Examples of 
some security measures are given in table 20. 
Table 20: Security measures within sophistication levels292 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Implement a service continuity strategy for the 
communications networks and/or services provided.  
 
 Documented service conti-
nuity strategy, including re-
covery time objectives for 
key services and processes.  
 Management commitment 
with the continuity strate-
gy.  
 
 
2 
 
 Implement contingency plans for critical systems.  
 Monitor activation and execution of contingency 
plans, registering successful and failed recovery 
times.  
 
 
 Contingency plans for criti-
cal systems, including clear 
steps and procedures for 
common threats, triggers 
for activation, steps and re-
covery time objectives.  
 The decision process for 
activating contingency 
plans.  
 Logs of activation and exe-
cution of contingency plans, 
including decisions taken, 
steps followed, final recov-
ery time.  
 
 
3 
 Review and revise service continuity strategy peri-
odically.  
 Review and revise contingency plans, based on past 
incidents and changes.  
 The continuity of operations plan is tested and 
updated on a regular basis.  
 Personnel involved in the continuing operations 
 Up to date continuity strat-
egy and contingency plans, 
review comments, and/or 
change logs.  
 Documented results of the 
continuity of operations 
test activities.  
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plan are trained in their roles and responsibilities 
with respect to the information system and receive 
refresher training on an organization-defined fre-
quency.  
 
 Records of individual 
training activities  
 
 
SO.18: Disaster recovery capabilities 
The ability to assist an organization to overcome a natural or/and major disaster should 
be provided by setting up clear lines of recovery procedures for initiating the established  
business contingency plan. Examples of such type of security measures are given in ta-
ble 21. 
Table 21: Security measures within sophistication levels293 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
1  Prepare for recovery and restoration of services 
following disasters.  
 
 Measures are in place for 
dealing with disasters, such 
as failover sites in other re-
gions, backups of critical da-
ta to remote locations, et 
cetera.  
 
 
2 
 Implement policy/procedures for deploying disas-
ter recovery capabilities.  
 Implement industry standard disaster recovery ca-
pabilities or be assured they are available from 
third parties (such as national emergency net-
works).  
 
 Documented poli-
cy/procedures for deploying 
disaster recovery capabili-
ties, including a list of natu-
ral and/or major disasters 
that could affect the ser-
vices, and a list of disaster 
recovery capabilities (either 
those available internally or 
provided by third parties).  
 Industry standard imple-
mentation of disaster capa-
bilities, such as mobile 
equipment, mobile sites, 
failover sites, et cetera.  
 
  Advanced implementation controls for disaster 
recovery capabilities to mitigate natural and/major 
 Advanced implementation 
controls for disaster recov-
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3 disasters.  
 Review and update disaster recovery capabilities 
regularly, taking into account changes, past inci-
dents, and results of tests and exercises.  
 
ery capabilities, such as full 
redundancy and failover 
mechanisms to handle natu-
ral and/or major disasters.  
 Data centre infrastruc-
ture/design is designed for 
availability, auto failover, 
and resiliency to maintain 
service to customers.  
 Updated documentation of 
disaster recovery capabili-
ties in place, review com-
ments and/or change logs.  
 
 
SO.19: Monitoring and logging 
The organization should establish and maintain procedures and systems responsible for 
monitoring and logging of the offered services. Examples of security measures are giv-
en in table 22. 
Table 22: Security measures within sophistication levels294 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
1  Implement monitoring and logging of critical sys-
tems.  
 
 Logs and monitoring reports 
of critical network and in-
formation systems  
 
 
2 
 
 Implement a policy for logging and monitoring of 
critical systems.  
 Set up tools for monitoring critical systems.  
 Set up tools to collect and store logs critical sys-
tems.  
 
 
 List of auditable events.  
 Audit records containing at 
least:  
 Date and time of the event;  
o Component of the in-
formation system 
where the event con-
curred;  
o Type of event;  
o User/subject identity;  
o The outcome of the 
event.  
 Documented policy for mon-
itoring and logging, including 
minimum monitoring and 
logging requirements, reten-
tion period, and the overall 
objectives of storing moni-
toring data and logs.  
 Tools for monitoring sys-
                                                 
294 Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs”, pp. 40-41. 
 
  -83- 
tems and collecting logs.  
 List of monitoring data and 
log files, in line with the pol-
icy.  
 
3  Set up tools for automated collection and analysis 
of monitoring data and logs.  
 Review and update logging and monitoring poli-
cy/procedures, taking into account changes and 
past incidents.  
 
 Tools to facilitate structural 
recording and analysis of 
monitoring and logs.  
 Updated documentation of 
monitoring and logging poli-
cy/procedures, review 
comments, and/or change 
logs.  
 
 
 
SO.20: System tests 
The organization should establish and maintain appropriate procedures responsible for 
testing critical network and information systems. Examples of security measures are 
provided in table 23. 
Table 23: Security measures within sophistication levels295 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
 
1 
 
 Test networks and information systems before us-
ing them or connecting them to existing systems.  
 The installation or de-installation of patches is 
done in an ad hoc manner.  
 
 
 Test reports of the network 
and information systems, in-
cluding tests after big 
changes or the introduction 
of new systems.  
 Checks for latest patches  
 
 
 
2 
 
 Implement policy/procedures for testing network 
and information systems.  
 Implement tools for automated testing.  
 The installation or de-installation of patches is 
done periodically in an organized manner.  
 
 
 Policy/procedures for test-
ing networks and infor-
mation systems, including 
when tests must be carried 
out, test plans, test cases, 
test report templates.  
 Documented testing activi-
ties containing at least:  
o Objectives, roles, and 
responsibilities;  
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o The scope of the plan;  
o Detailed results of the 
execution of the plan;  
o The frequency of the 
test.  
 Approved documented ac-
tions applying patches.  
 
 
3 
 
 Review and update the policy/procedures for test-
ing, considering changes and past incidents.  
 The installation or de-installation of patches is re-
viewed to ensure the adequate implementation of 
the defined actions.  
 Exceptions to defined actions and approved miti-
gating actions are identified and documented.  
 
 
 List of test reports.  
 Updated policy/procedures 
for testing networks and in-
formation systems, review 
comments, and/or change 
log.  
 
 
 
SO.21: Security assessments 
The organization/company should establish and maintain appropriate procedures-
methodologies for performing security assessments of critical assets. Examples of secu-
rity measures are provided in table 24. 
Table 24: Security measures within sophistication levels296 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 
 Ensure critical systems undergo security scans and 
security testing regularly, particularly when new 
systems are introduced and following changes.  
 Vulnerabilities are monitored and assessed.  
 
 
 Reports from past security 
scans and security tests.  
 Documented vulnerability 
scans reports.  
 
 
2 
 
 Implement policy/procedures for security assess-
ments and security testing.  
 A single point of contact and communication 
channels for information security related issues 
with manufacturers or vendors have been identi-
fied.  
 
 
 Documented poli-
cy/procedures for security 
assessments and security 
testing, including, which as-
sets, in what circumstances, 
the type of security assess-
ments and tests, frequency, 
approved parties (internal or 
external), confidentiality 
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levels for assessment and 
test results and the objec-
tives security assessments 
and tests. 
  List of manufactures single 
point of contact.  
 
 
 
3 
 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of policy/procedures 
for security assessments and security testing.  
 Review and update policy/procedures for security 
assessments and security testing, taking into ac-
count changes and past incidents.  
 Information obtained from the vulnerability scan-
ning process is shared with designated personnel 
throughout the organization and authorities to 
help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other in-
formation systems.  
 
 
 List of reports about security 
assessments and security 
tests.  
 Reports of follow up actions 
on assessments and test re-
sults.  
 Up to date poli-
cy/procedures for security 
assessments and security 
testing, review comments, 
and/or change log.  
 Records of vulnerabilities 
information sharing  
 
 
 
SO.22: Compliance 
The organization/company should establish and maintain297  a policy which involves, 
checking the compliance of the internal policies in contrast with the national and EU 
legal requirements and industry best practices and standards. Examples of security 
measures are provided in table 25. 
Table 25: Security measures within sophistication levels298 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 Monitor compliance to standards and legal 
requirements.  
 
 Reports describing the 
result of compliance 
monitoring.  
 
 
2 
 Implement policy/procedures for compliance 
monitoring and auditing  
 
 Documented poli-
cy/procedures for moni-
toring compliance and 
auditing, including what 
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(assets, processes, infra-
structure), frequency, 
guidelines who should 
carry out audits (in- or 
external), relevant secu-
rity policies that are sub-
ject to compliance moni-
toring and auditing, the 
objectives and high level 
approach of compliance 
monitoring and auditing, 
templates for audit re-
ports.  
  Detailed monitoring 
and audit plans, includ-
ing long-term high-level 
objectives and planning.  
 
 
 
3 
 
 Review and update the policy/procedures for 
testing, taking into account changes and past 
incidents.  
 The installation or de-installation of patches 
is reviewed to ensure the adequate imple-
mentation of the defined actions.  
 Exceptions to defined actions and approved 
mitigating actions are identified and docu-
mented.  
 
 List of all compliance 
and audit reports  
o Root cause analysis 
to the compliance 
and audit reports.  
 Remediation plans for 
critical assets.  
 Updated poli-
cy/procedures for com-
pliance and auditing, re-
view comments, and/or 
change logs.  
 
 
 
SO.23: Security of data at rest 
The organization/company should establish and maintain appropriate security 
mechanisms for protecting the data at rest. Examples of security measures are given in 
table 26. 
Table 26: Security measures within sophistication levels299. 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
  Identify the most critical data taking into ac-
count relevant business needs and legal obli-
gations (e.g. with regard to the processing of 
 The access control, sharing, 
copying, transmittal and dis-
tribution of confidential and 
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1 
personal data).  
 Retain the critical data for a certain period 
depending on the type of data and its criticali-
ty  
  Implement cryptographic mechanisms to pro-
tect the confidentiality and integrity of infor-
mation stored on digital media during 
transport outside of controlled areas and in 
transit when moving within and between 
company data locations.  
 Implement cryptographic mechanisms such as 
digital signatures and hashes to detect unau-
thorized changes to critical data at rest.  
  Implement mechanisms for the secure dispos-
al of the data after their lawful use.  
 
restricted data are defined  
 Safeguards to protect the se-
crecy of secret (private) key(s) 
are in place  
 Limited or ad hoc processes 
exist to protect electronic me-
dia  
 Evidence from regular reviews 
of devices/storage media to 
examine that data is removed 
or securely overwritten prior 
to disposal.  
 
 
 
2 
 Classify all data according to a classification 
scheme which takes into account data’s value, 
legal requirements, sensitivity, and criticality 
to the organization.  
 Use of removable media is prohibited unless 
strictly required.  
 Ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data 
at rest according to the classification scheme.  
 Establish a policy around confidentiality and 
integrity of data at rest and make all personnel 
to whom it is relevant, are aware of the policy 
and procedure and what it implies for their 
work.  
 Set detailed cryptographic key establishment 
and management policies and procedures for 
data at rest (only if cryptography has been im-
plemented).  
 
 A set of best practice procedures are in place 
for the secure disposal of physical assets.  
 
 Data retention policy exists 
and is complete  
 Formal standard to govern the 
protection of electronic trans-
portable media is in place. En-
cryption enforced on electron-
ic media identified with confi-
dential information.  
 Evidence for the existence of 
mechanisms which support in 
ensuring confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the data at rest such 
as cryptographic mechanisms, 
file share scanning, secure of-
fline storage, removal of sensi-
tive data from storage media 
etc. according to the classifica-
tion scheme.  
 Evidence of the existence of a 
mechanism (either manual or 
automated) for the establish-
ment and management of 
cryptographic keys (only if 
cryptography has been imple-
mented).  
 
 Obtain evidence of written 
authorization to dispose of 
equipment from Department 
Head. A disposal form should 
be completed.  
 
 
 
3 
 Classify all assets according to the classification 
scheme.  
 Implement information labelling and handling 
procedures in accordance with the classifica-
tion scheme  
 The data retention policy considers the value 
 Labelling of information of 
information is reviewed on a 
regular basis  
 The data retention policy is 
supported by a comprehensive 
data retention schedule, which 
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of data over time and the data retention laws 
the organization may be subject to.  
 Strong controls are in place surrounding con-
nection of media devices.  
 Use automated key management mechanisms.  
 Review of confidentiality and integrity of data 
at rest policy.  
 Disposal of assets at the most opportune time 
in line with company objectives, strategy and 
the data retention policy, using the most ap-
propriate methods.  
 
contains the retention period 
for each type of data used by 
the organization  
 Reports of the data retention 
policy and configuration which 
ensure that they are in line 
with requirements and good 
practices  
 Technology infrastructure au-
tomatically encrypts and pro-
tects electronic transportable 
media in the environment.  
 Portable media standards are 
reviewed at least annually and 
on an ad hoc basis for any new 
technology or threats.  
 Evidence that the public-key 
encryption and secret key of 
user and cypher-text are based 
on the subject’s attributes.  
 Documentation of the review 
process, taking into account 
changes and past incidents. 
Review the policy on a regular 
basis  
 Personnel is aware of the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the 
data at rest policy and proce-
dures and what it implies for 
their work (interview). Review 
comments or change logs for 
the policy and/or procedure.  
 Evidence of secure key genera-
tion, use, storage and destruc-
tion of data.  
 The rationale for disposal of 
assets and the methods used is 
provided. Review of physical 
asset inventory. All devices 
leaving the controlled envi-
ronment must be purged of 
data using disk wiping utilities 
or degas-sing methods (refor-
matting is not enough)  
 
 
 
SO.24: Interface security 
An appropriate policy should be established and maintained by the organiza-
tion/company for ensuring the protection of the interfaces of services which use person-
al data. Examples of such type of security measures are provided in table 27. 
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Table 27: Security measures within sophistication levels300 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
   
 
 
1 
 
 Set a high-level security policy for keeping the 
cloud and online market interfaces secure  
 Make key personnel aware of the security policy.  
 Enable secure channels for data transmission (e.g. 
TLS2.0)  
 Use unique identifiers to identify users  
 
 
 Documented security policy, 
including networks and ser-
vices in scope, critical assets 
supporting them, and the se-
curity objectives.  
 Key personnel are aware of 
the security policy and its ob-
jectives (interview).  
 At least one secure channel is 
enabled.  
 All customers are assigned to 
a unique identifier.  
 
 
 
2 
 
 Set detailed security policies for data security to 
include protection of customer administration in-
terfaces (TLS2.0, 2-Factor authentication) etc.  
 Make all personnel aware of the security policy and 
what it implies for their work.  
 Review the security policy following incidents.  
 Implement 2-Factor authentication  
 
 
 Documented security policies, 
approved by management, 
including applicable law and 
regulations, accessible to per-
sonnel.  
 Personnel is aware of the 
security policy and what it 
implies for their work (inter-
view).  
 Review comments or change 
logs for the policy.  
 
 
 
3 
 
 Review the security policy periodically, and take 
into account violations, exceptions, past incidents, 
past tests/exercises, and incidents affecting other 
(similar) providers in the sector.  
 
 
 Security policies are up to 
date and approved by senior 
management.  
 Logs of policy exceptions, 
approved by the relevant 
roles.  
 Documentation of the review 
process, taking into account 
changes and past incidents.  
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SO.25: Software security 
The development of software should be ensured through the designing process301. Ex-
amples of security measures are given in table 28. 
Table 28: Security measures within sophistication levels302 
LEVEL SECURITY MEASURES 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
 
1 
 
 
 Establish guidelines for maintaining software secu-
rity  
 
 Documented guidelines, to 
ensure that software securi-
ty is maintained.  
 Key personnel are aware of 
the guidelines and its objec-
tives (interview).  
 
 
 
2 
 
 Implement a defined set of security measures to 
secure development environments, including 
measures for protecting test data.  
 Depending on the type of requirement include 
software testing methods (e.g. black-box, ad-hoc 
testing).  
 
 Keep separated environments for development 
purposes, testing purposes and production.  
 
 
 Evidence of the test results 
to secure development envi-
ronments, including 
measures for protecting test 
data are maintained.  
 Evidence of the software 
testing methods chosen for 
a particular test scenario 
and explanation of this.  
 
 Evidence of separated envi-
ronments for development, 
testing and production.  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 Security by design is tested at various stages of the 
SDLC prior to Go-live utilizing independent tools 
and a self-service testing platform throughout 
SDLC.  
 Results of application assessments are used to reg-
ularly enhance developer training and the SDLC 
process.  
 
 
 Test results of each phase of 
the SDLC are maintained 
and are up to date. Test re-
sults are maintained and 
approved by senior man-
agement  
 Documented evidence of 
the review process of the 
patch development process, 
security training for soft-
ware developments and se-
cure by design software con-
figurations  
 Evidence that a software 
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302 ENISA, Technical guidelines for the implementation of minimum security measures for DSPs, p. 50. 
 
  -91- 
testing method is chosen at 
each stage of the software 
development lifecycle  
 
 
For each of these security objectives, the specifically dedicated security measures 
(ways) and means listed in the above tables provide also evidence for their implementa-
tion, according to international and national security standards. It should be reminded 
that the Directive is concerned about the theoretical background of the choice of 
measures and not for the practical issue as such. Each stakeholder may adopt such secu-
rity measures that follow the NIS Directive’s objectives, i.e. a high common level303 of 
information systems and networks security within EU. 
 
2.6.4 Notification requirement for digital service providers  
The digital service providers, defined by the NIS Directive in Annex III, are required to 
report any incident having a substantial impact on the provision of their services to the 
national competent authorities or the CSIRT, only in the following situations: 
 The provider has access to all this information required to report an incident so 
that the reporting can be done properly304; 
 The provider is not considered a micro and small digital service provider305, 
otherwise, it will be excluded from implementing the incident notification pro-
visions.  
 
The criteria that are provided by the NISD in case any of the three basic principles of 
information security has been compromised (confidentiality, integrity and availability) 
for assessing the type of the impact that the security incident poses on the provision of 
their services, which are based on the five parameters found in Article 16(4) NIS Di-
rective:  
a. “The number of users affected by the incident, in particular users relying on 
the service for the provision of their own services”;  
b. “The duration of the incident”;  
                                                 
303 The so-called “state of the art” level of security. 
304 Article 16(4). 
305 Article 16(11). 
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c.  “The geographical spread with regard to the area affected by the incident”;  
d. “The extent of the disruption of the functioning of the service”;  
e.  “The extent of the impact on economic and societal activities”.  
For enabling a coherent European implementation of thresholds for the above parame-
ters, by different stakeholders under similar circumstances, the Commission306 issued 
the Commission Implementing Regulation 2018/51307,  in which establishes a set of in-
cident notification provisions for adopting common thresholds for common parameters.  
According to Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation 2018/51, the thresholds for as-
sessing an incident as substantial are: 
a. The incident caused an unavailability of the core service more than 5 000 000 
user hours, whereby the term user hour refers to the number of affected users in 
the EU for a duration of sixty minutes.  
b. The incident caused a loss of confidentiality, integrity or authenticity of data or 
services affecting more than 100 000 users.  
c.  The incident created risks for public safety, public security or of loss of life. 
d.  The incident caused damage to at least one user in the Union where the damage 
caused to that user exceeds EUR 1 000000.  
So, the digital service providers should consider the above-defined thresholds while as-
sessing and defining the classification process of the impact of any incident. However, it 
should be noted the Implementing Regulation is silent about the case of an incident to a 
digital service used in the context of essential services308. 
 
The DSPs have the right to impose additional measures in case there is a need to ensure 
national security and to facilitate the investigation, detection and prosecution of crimi-
nal offences; if any reported incident is related to criminal activities, it should be report-
ed to law enforcement authorities309. In contrast to OESs, DSPs are imposed to a “light-
                                                 
306 The Commission was empowered pursuant to Article 16(8). 
307 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down 
rules for application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as re-
gards further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for manag-
ing the risks posed to the security of network and information systems and of the parameters for deter-
mining whether an incident has a substantial impact. 
308 Porcedda, Patching the patchwork: appraising the EU regulatory framework on cyber security breach-
es, Computer Law & Security Review 2018, p. 10. 
309 Recital 62: “Where appropriate, it is desirable that coordination between competent authorities and law 
enforcement authorities of different Member States be facilitated by the European Cybercrime Centre 
(EC3) and ENISA”. 
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er-touch” approach concerning their security requirements. More specifically, Member 
States are not allowed to impose any further security or notification requirements on 
DSPs; on the contrary, the minimum-security requirements for DSPs should be lighter 
than those of the OES, and they should remain free to take the measures that they deem 
appropriate.  
Additionally, a light-touch approach is provided to DSPs in case of jurisdiction issues. 
The DSP must report the incident to the Member State (to the national competent au-
thority or the CSIRT) where it has its main establishment310. There is, however, the pos-
sibility that the DSP offers services in the EU without having the infrastructure estab-
lished in the EU territory311. In that case, the DSP should designate a representative in 
the Union. The representative may be chosen between one of those Member States 
where its services are offered312.  
 
2.6.4.1 General notification of incident scheme for DSPs  
Diagram 3 describes the notification process of an incident. In the case of an incident, 
the DSPs should assess the impact313 regarding the provision of the service. If it is about 
a substantial impact, then the DSP is required to report the incident. But primarily the 
provider should assess whether the operational status of an operator of essential services 
is based on its technology infrastructure, so the provision of essential services is affect-
ed negatively. In that case, the report of the incident will be performed by the operator 
of essential services under the defined notifying requirements by the Directive314. 
Otherwise, the digital service provider will - without undue delay - notify the competent 
authority or the CSIRT, where its main establishment or its designated representative is 
located315. This implies that the startup notifying time of the incident will be the mo-
ment that there has been an indication that the provision of the service has been affect-
ed316. Such an indicator may be e.g. a report from a user or even through a self-check 
activity by personnel or software.  
                                                 
310 Article 18(1) and recital 64. 
311 Article 18(2) and recital 65. 
312 ENISA, Incident notification for DSPs in the context of the NIS Directive”, FEBRUARY 2017, p. 10, 
This interpretation of the light-touch approach was presented by Commission’s representatives, during 
ENISA’s Network and Information Security Workshop in Bratislava, 17-18.10.2016. 
313 The DSP will execute the algorithm used for the classification of impact (the five parameters). 
314 Article 16(5). 
315 Article 17(3). 
316 Without undue delay. 
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Diagram 3: Incident notification process for DSPs. 
 
The form template of the information data that will be communicated through the noti-
fication process should include: 
 The starting time; 
 The ending time317; 
 The name of the notifying person;  
 The description of the incident in terms of what systems and/or services were af-
fected negatively. 
 All these incident details will help the competent authority to assess which other coun-
tries should be informed (in case of cross-border impact affection)318. 
 If the nature of the incidents’ impact arises public awareness then it is strictly required 
that the public is informed319 either from the provider or from the competent authority, 
within the meaning of preventing or responding to an on-going incident.  
 
 
 
                                                 
317 In case the incident has been handled successfully, then the duration of the incident may be used e.g. 
for statistical reasons.  
318 Article 16(6). 
319 Article 16(7) and recital 67. 
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2.6.4.2 The incident notification as part of the overall incident man-
agement process  
 
 
Picture 10: The overall incident notification process at EU level320. 
 
By examining the picture 10 we may understand the incident notification process for the 
digital service providers as following: 
1. The DSP of country A may come across with a security incident; 
2. The DSP performs its defined “classification of incident” process, based on 
the parameters provided by the Directive in article 16(4), to assess whether the inci-
dent should be reported; 
3. The digital service provider should assess any probable interconnection with 
the provision of essential services as defined in article 16(5); 
4. The digital service provider of country A reports the incident to the NCA or 
the CSIRT of its main establishment or that of its representative 321; 
5. In case the security incident should be communicated to more Member States, 
the competent authority or CSIRT forwards the reported incident to the SPOC of 
country A by requesting to be extended forward to the Member States that were in-
dicated as being affected through the cross-border affection process. Thus, the 
                                                 
320 Incident notification for DSPs in the context of the NIS Directive FEBRUARY 2017, p. 18. 
321 Article 17(3). 
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SPOC of country A forwards the reported incident to the SPOC of e.g. country B in 
order to forward it to the relative competent authority or CSIRT of country B322; 
6. The CSIRT will provide support to the notifying digital service provider for han-
dling the incident; 
7. The NCA or the CSIRT or the digital service provider of country A will communi-
cate the incident to the public for raising awareness purposes323; 
8. In the meantime, the SPOC communicates with the Coop-Group for receiving guid-
ance and support from the CSIRT network for receiving the appropriate information 
for handling the incident in case it is needed. 
 
2.6.5 Requirements for the Member States concerning the DSP 
notification requirement 
The national competent authorities are responsible for ensuring that the digital ser-
vice providers are compliant with their obligations as they are indicated in Article 
16, for taking the appropriate and proportionate security and operational measures, 
including documented security policies for ensuring the state-of-the-art security lev-
el of the networks and information systems used for the provision of their services. 
The role of the national competent authorities is to serve as an external “ex-post su-
pervisor” - auditor to the DSPs with the responsibility to monitor their compliance 
with the NIS Directive’s notification objectives324. Pursuant to the light-touch ap-
proach of non-compliance to the requirements of Article 16, the digital service pro-
vider would be audited by its national competent authority in case there is evidence 
provided by the competent authority from a different Member State, where also the 
service is provided325. 
In this respect, a similar operational policy with the auditing team responsible for 
supervising the operators of essential services should be established and maintained 
to support the proper and efficient function of this process, including326: 
 Educational requirements for the personnel; 
                                                 
322 Article 16(6). 
323 Article 16(7). 
324 This is an additional element that supports the light-touch approach concerning the DSPs’ security 
requirements. 
325 Article 17(1). 
326 In terms of article 17(2)(a). 
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 Defined capacities of human resources and facilities; 
 Type of assessment; 
 Operational procedures with clearly defined: 
 roles and responsibilities; 
 the type of the incident for ensuring interaction with relevant legislation; 
 the identification of documented information required alongside with the 
purpose of requesting it; 
 the frequency of the audits alongside with its preventive objectives;  
 the dedicated communication channels between the relative entities; and, 
 the provision of a documented report based on the evidence found 
through the assessment of the implemented security measures. 
 
The documented report should underpin the level of compliance of the digital ser-
vice provider. In the case of partial compliance or even worse non-compliance, the 
competent authority should provide guidance to the digital service provider for re-
mediation treatment327.  
· 
2.7 Final provisions,  
Chapters VI and VII of the NISD include the last general provisions aiming to facilitate 
and achieve a coherent implementation approach of the NIS Directive within the EU 
while promoting the incident notification requirement between voluntary and obliged CI 
stakeholders. More specifically: 
 The EU intention is to promote the convergent application of cybersecurity 
measures within identified OESs and certain defined DSPs without imposing 
specific technological products. For this reason, the use of European or interna-
tionally accepted standards and specifications on the security of networks and 
information systems is supported328. 
 The rest CI that do not belong into identified OESs and certain defined DSPs 
may choose to report events with significant operational implications on the con-
tinuity of their provided services on a voluntary basis without having the obliga-
                                                 
327 Article 17(2)(b). 
328 Article 19. 
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tion to take additional security measures. However, the competent authorities 
should give priority to mandatory notifications and then to volunteers without 
causing disproportionate or unnecessary burdens for the Member States con-
cerned329. 
 The Member States should impose sanctions on a natural and legal person in the 
event of any breach of the provisions of this law and should have communicated 
them to the European Commission by 9/5/2018330. 
 The Coop-Group and CSIRT network have initiated their tasks as of 9/2/2017.  
 The Commission will periodically review the implementation of this Directive 
at operational and strategic level, by submitting a relevant report including an 
inventory evaluation taking into account the reports of the cooperation group 
and the CSIRT network on the experience gained at strategic and operational 
levels. The first report will be submitted by 9 May 2021331. 
 Until 9/11/2018 important assistance has been provided to the Member States 
regarding the process of identifying OESs332. 
 Until 9/02/ 2017, Member States should have designated appropriate representa-
tion in the cooperation group and the CSIRT network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
329 Article 20. 
330 Article 21. 
331 Article 23. 
332 Article 24. 
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3 Evaluation of NIS Directive’s 
context 
The implementation of the NIS Directive comes at a significant moment of a global 
change in the security area of ICT systems against new emerged cyber threats. The 
technological development in the way information is managed and handled through 
networked facilities333, makes it imperative to harmonize the European Union with the 
two new cyber regimes in the United States: The National Cybersecurity Protection Act 
of 2014334  and the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 
2014335. 
More specifically: 
1. The NIS Directive sets up the new conception of security approach336, the so-
called security by design. The security objectives, regarding the networks and 
information systems, should include: 
A. Management of the security risk; 
B. Protection337 against cyber-attacks; 
C. Detection of cybersecurity events; 
D. Deterring the impact of cybersecurity incidents. 
 
2. The security measures required for incident handling while notifying the signifi-
cant security incidents for the identified OESs and DSPs both formalize a 
revolutionary change in the cybersecurity conception.  
3. Concerning the incident handling obligations, the new security conception in-
cludes the implementation of a risk assessment process for identifying threats 
coming from intentional and unintentional actors against the information sys-
                                                 
333 The way we create, store and consume data 
334 The National Cybersecurity Protection Act, PUBLIC LAW 113–282—DEC. 18, 2014. 
335The National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act H.R.3696 — 113th Congress 
(2013-2014). 
336Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Victor Mauer, Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, Power and Security in the Infor-
mation Age: Investigating the Role of the State in Cyberspace. 
337 In terms of responding to threats. 
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tems and network infrastructures. Through the Risk Assessment, the relevant 
stakeholders will be able to understand how prepared they are against new 
emerged threats and decide on what type of additional operational and technical 
measures they should take for managing the risk.  
4. Particularly interesting is the introduction of an incident notification scheme, 
given the fact that there were no laws requiring incident reporting since the en-
actment of the NISD.  
For example, in case an attack occurs, traditional ways do not provide for an 
immediate reaction. This incident handling approach may carry risks of loss of 
critical data due to intentional or unintentional malicious activities coming from 
both inside or outside an organization. 
So, the incident notification obligation without undue delay is considered quite 
revolutionary in the information era; it actually reveals the way the EU is ex-
posed to cyber risks while extending its knowledge on the actual cyber-threat 
landscape and promoting an effective handling of them. 
5. The tougher obligations imposed to organizations338 in case of not being compli-
ant to NIS Directive’s obligations, the more positive dynamism is added in up-
dating and upgrading their cybersecurity capabilities at the national level.  
6. The establishment of general provisions on key operational issues seems to be 
quite strategic in handling any jurisdiction and responsibility issue339. More spe-
cifically, the legislator focuses on achieving a coherent approach340 within EU, 
without leaving any margin of misunderstanding and overlaps between the rele-
vant stakeholders. Given the complexity of the issue, since many responsible ac-
tors are involved, there is a need for a simple but quite strategic plan for counter-
feiting the cybersecurity risks posed on networks and information systems and 
providing the standards on achieving preparedness, resilience and deterring of 
such threats. The simpler a system is the more effective approach we may fol-
low. 
                                                 
338 Performed by establishing binding laws to serve as a penalty measure. 
339Such as between Member States, relevant Stakeholders of CI and relevant issued legislation at national 
level. 
340 Helena Carrapico and Andree Barrinha, The EU as a Coherent (Cyber)Security Actor?  
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7. The adoption of a National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) serves as a tool for 
strengthening the role of the State in forcing the establishment of an advanced 
security level on the CI of both public and the private sector.  
8. The issues that harden the strategy making the decision are distinguished into 
three categories: 
i. The globally interconnected information systems demonstrate the limitations 
and ineffectiveness of previous security fragmented and with significant 
differences in maturity level approaches taken by individual countries;  
ii. The proposed responses by the strategy341 to control or regulate the risks 
would impact the freedom of expression value that underlies the cyber 
revolution 
iii. The constant appearance of new and more sophisticated threats that may be 
identified yet at the time of the incident. 
9. Taking into consideration the complexity hidden into the new dynamics of the 
strategy342 field, a need for a metadata hands-on approach by promoting a gov-
ernance rationale for all owners of critical infrastructure is required343. 
10. The proposed security approach focuses on both of the following views: 
 system and 
 people344. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 of the thesis, an information system consists of the 
following elements: procedures, software; data345, people and hardware utilities. 
The fact that human errors are considered as key factors on causing security 
problems either intentionally or unintentionally, introduces the need to monitor 
and record the behaviour of the system from two different aspects, aiming to 
achieve better and holistic strategy on cybersecurity of the networked ICT infra-
structures. In this sense, Critical Infrastructure stakeholders are required to de-
velop, implement and maintain a Cyber Security System Management (CSSM) 
                                                 
341 The action framework activities included in the content of the strategy. 
342 C. F. Kurtz D. J. Snowden, The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicat-
ed world. 
343George Christou, Cybersecurity in the European Union: Resilience and Adaptability in Governance 
Policy,  
344 User, personnel. 
345 In terms of information and services. 
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including a range of policies and procedures taken by organizations for system-
atically managing organization's sensitive data aiming to minimize and en-
sure business continuity,  by pro-actively addressing not only risks evolving 
from particular implemented technological products but also risks originated 
from physical and environmental threats (e.g. a physical threat may be an em-
ployee’s behavior to not follow the defined security process for data in transit or 
at rest). The efficient and effective protection of networks and information sys-
tems requires a balanced handling between security measures and residual 
risk346 in order to satisfy each of the above-mentioned objectives.  
11. Information-sharing among private and public stakeholders is a powerful mech-
anism to better understand the constantly changing environment. In this sense, 
owners of critical infrastructures could potentially share with public authorities 
their input on mitigating emerging risks, threats, and vulnerabilities while public 
stakeholders could provide on a 'need to know basis' information on aspects re-
lated to the status of national security347. Combining both views gives a very 
powerful insight into how the threat landscape evolves. 
12. The purpose of having a CSIRT is an effective operational security measure and 
involves: 
 Centralized and specialized348 handling of IT security incidents reported 
from various types of CSIRTs349, 
 "Dealing with legal issues and preserving evidence in the event of a law-
suit”350; 
 Consistent awareness and knowledge gained on technical and organiza-
tional security approaches; 
 Encouraging cooperation351 within the different entities on IT security is-
sues. 
                                                 
346 The threat that remains after all efforts done to identify and mitigate risk, such as: to reduce it, to avoid 
it or to transfer it (e.g. to an insurance company). 
347 Based on their implemented network security tools. 
348 By providing expertise in assisting the relevant stakeholders to quickly recover and return to normal 
operations. 
349 There are many types of CSIRT, such as: Academic Sector CSIRT, Commercial CSIRT, CIP/CIIP 
Sector CSIRT, Governmental Sector CSIRT, Internal CSIRT, Military Sector CSIRT, National CSIRT, 
Small & Medium Enterprises (SME) Sector CSIRT, Vendor CSIRT; see further details in ENISA, A Step-
by-step Approach on how to set up a CSIRT, p. 9. 
350 ENISA, A Step-by-step Approach on how to set up a CSIRT, p. 8. 
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More specifically, in case of an incident handling, at least two or more security ana-
lysts typically collaborate such as: 
 Within a CSIRT; 
 Between teams within an organization; 
 Between different organizations. 
For example, a national CSIRT collaborates with CSIRTs from other countries to 
handle incidents. Although software and hardware security products are considered 
as critical components for cyber defence purposes, so are the social processes fol-
lowed between related entities during the incident handling procedure. In other 
words, cybersecurity incident failures may occur not only due to technological 
breakdowns352 but also due to poor coordination and collaboration353.  
13. Hardware and software-based network security tools354 are required to be imple-
mented by CI stakeholders including: 
 Firewall; 
 Encryption tools; 
 Traffic monitoring tools; 
 Rootkit detection tools355; 
 Application-specific scanner; 
 Vulnerability scanner; 
 Port scanner;  
 Intrusion detection system; 
 Packet crafting tools356; 
                                                                                                                                               
351 By building awareness. 
352 Abrams, M., & Weiss, J., Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study - Maroochy 
Water Services, Australia. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security Division 
(2008) 
353Organizational scientists have noted, “failures of team leadership, coordination, and communication are 
well documented causes of the majority of air crashes, medical errors, and industrial disasters”, Kozlowski 
&Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Work Groups and Teams, p. 78, 2006. 
354As defined by, William J. Caelli, Security in Open and Distributed Systems: Information Management 
& Computer Security, Vol. 2, pp. 18-24. 
355 A rootkit is a clandestine computer program designed to provide continued privileged access to a 
computer while actively hiding its presence. Therefore, these tools are essential tools for deterring hack-
ers from inserting a preferably hidden rootkit (e.g. Trojan) on the victim’s machine.  
356 This tool is used from network administrators for manually generating packets to test network devices, 
such as firewalls, IDSs, and for auditing network protocols (e.g. TCP/IP Stack) for detecting vulnerabili-
ties, http://www.scs.ryerson.ca/~zereneh/cn8822/PacketCrafting.pdf 
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 Antivirus; 
 Spyware detector tools357; 
 Security-oriented Operating systems (OS); 
 Packet sniffing tools. 
14. Until recently, the lowest number of adoptions of security tools came from 
small-sized companies, followed by medium-sized companies due to limited re-
sources in financial and technical resources358. However, they are all obliged to 
adopt basic security tools that at least protect the confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability of the information flows through the networked communication environ-
ment. 
15.  ISO 27001 (2018) is considered a globally recognized standard that provides a 
best-practices framework for address the entire range of cyber risks, by encom-
passing personnel, procedures and use of technology for establishing, imple-
menting and maintaining the protection of businesses’ objectives.  
16. It is quite interesting that most EU Member States missed NIS Directive dead-
line359; until 10/8/2018 (three months past the transposition deadline) only 11 
nations have complied, i.e. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and UK360.  
This fact, however, entails significant lack of advice implemented for each 
Member State. More specifically, had the organizations implemented had trans-
posed the NIS Directive into national law more promptly, the accessibility of 
advice from regulators and consultancy would have advocate the adoption of se-
curity tools for the rest of the EU Member States361.  
 
                                                 
357 Such as keyloggers. 
358 N. Darmawan, A. Yee-Loong Chong, Keng-Boon Ooi and V. A/L Venggadasallam N. Darmawan, A. 
Yee-Loong Chong, Keng-Boon Ooi and V. A/L Venggadasallam, Security Mechanism in Computer Net-
work Environment: A Study of Adoption Status in Malaysian Company (a research article),  available at: 
http://docsdrive.com/pdfs/ansinet/jas/2009/2735-2743.pdf 
359 Probably being in the shadow of the EU GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) that came into 
force on 25/5/2018. 
360 Available at: https://www.itgovernance.eu/blog/en/majority-of-eu-member-states-missed-nis-directive-
deadline 
361 In the sense that if member states haven’t integrated the transposition of the directive, no one can be 
quite sure on the best way to prepare. 
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17. The establishment of a “European Cybersecurity Certification Framework for ICT 
products and services is recommended for addressing the multiple certifications 
risks promoted by various companies. More specifically, these companies certify 
ICT products, but they do not always follow the same procedures and standards. 
Considering the interoperability issues entailed due to the networked communica-
tion of ICT products (e.g. Internet of Things - IoT) the EC proposed the implemen-
tation of the voluntary “Framework” making use of existing Union and international 
technical standards for replacing all existing national cybersecurity certification 
schemes or procedures for ICT products and services which will be prepared by 
ENISA362.  
According to the Commission’s belief, the proposed Framework and European cy-
bersecurity certification schemes will make certification less expensive, more effec-
tive, and more commercially attractive, thus helping to spread better cybersecurity 
practices throughout the EU363. 
18. Although the light-touch approach aims at avoiding overburdening the DSPs, spe-
cial concern should be imposed on ensuring the swift and efficient way of incident 
reporting while not hampering the capacity of the EU to react to cybersecurity inci-
dents in a swift and efficient manner, by setting up the types of incidents and pa-
rameters to that will be used.  
 
 
 
                                                 
362 The new proposed Regulation will be known as the EU “Cybersecurity Act, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-477-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF 
363Kurt Wimmer Covington, The EU Gets Serious About Cyber: The EU Cybersecurity Act and Other 
Elements of the “Cyber Package, available at: https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/2017/09/the_eu_gets_serious_about_cyber.pdf 
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4 Analysis of the current situa-
tion in Greece 
In Greece, cybersecurity policy concerns several Ministries due to previous relevant ac-
tions, which however have created overlaps and ambiguities. For this purpose, the Gen-
eral Secretariat of Digital Policy (GSDP) 364 was established for maintaining the leading 
role in the governance of cybersecurity in the country, taking into consideration the con-
tribution of all involved entities.  
4.1 The GSDP’s mission 
The GSDP’s mission is to develop the national cybersecurity strategy which deals with 
the security of networked information systems including both public and private sector 
critical infrastructures, taking into consideration the increased development of ICT and 
the evolving interdependences between the interconnected digital infrastructures in dai-
ly social and economic activities of the country. 
 
4.1.1 The GSDP’s objectives 
 
The GSDP was established having the following strategic objectives365: 
a) The development and maintaining of a National Cybersecurity Strategy 
(NCSS) demonstrates the national action plan for strengthening the cyber pro-
tection of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), using in infra-
structures that support the development of the digital single European market. 
b) Monitoring the implementation of the NCSS while providing coordination be-
tween the involved Ministries about the individual actions to implement the 
NCSS. 
                                                 
364 Part of the Ministry of Digital Policy, Ν. 4389/2016. 
365 http://mindigital.gr/index.php/announcments-ggdp/1109-systasi-tis-genikis-grammateias-psifiakis-
politikis 
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c) The assessment of the implementation of the NCSS while submitting an 
additional relative proposal to engaged Ministries and entities, such as compe-
tent authorities and institutional and educational bodies. 
d) The international representation of Greece on matters concerning the NCSS. 
 
4.1.2 The governance framework of cybersecurity in Greece  
 
The governance structure of the General Secretariat for Digital Policy (GSDP) is de-
picted in table 29.  
Table 29: The governance structure of GSDP. 
GENERAL SECRETARIAT FOR DIGITAL POLICY 
Department of Information 
Security and Networks 
Department of  
Security Control 
 
Department of  
Coordination and Domain 
Names 
 
4.1.2.1 Department of information security and networks 
The department of information security and networks is responsible for providing sup-
port and guidance to all relevant stakeholders on the establishment of appropriate and 
proportionate security measures, in order to be compliant to the requirements of the NIS 
Directive and any other relative EU Directive.  
 
4.1.2.2 Tasks of the department of information security and networks  
The role of this department is strategic in366: 
a) Developing the Cybersecurity Strategy for Greek CI; 
b) Developing and maintaining the information security policy for the public sector 
infrastructures; 
c) Supporting the development of a security by design approach in the public sec-
tor’s ICT infrastructures by defining rules and procedures; 
                                                 
366 Department of information security and networks ,Άρθρο 05-Αρμοδιότητες Οργανικών Μονάδων της 
Γενικής Γραμματείας Ψηφιακής Πολιτικής. Available at: http://www.opengov.gr/ypes/?p=3408 
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d) Promoting cooperation and building of trust among relevant authorities, regula-
tory, institutional and educational bodies. 
e) Establishing cooperation with the National CERT and any other established 
CSIRT at national CI sector.  
f) Promoting culture, training and raising public awareness of the public sector. 
 
 
4.2 The Hellenic Cybersecurity Strategy (HCSS)367 
The Cybersecurity Strategy of Greece was published recently368 and depicts the Greek 
society needs and interests. 
4.2.1 Principles of the Hellenic Cybersecurity Strategy (HCSS) 
The Hellenic cybersecurity strategy protects the interconnected operational environment 
of digital infrastructures (public and private sector) by ensuring the integrity, availabil-
ity, confidentiality and availability of information flows through the networked 
installation while supporting the principle of open society along with constitutional 
freedoms and individual rights. 
4.2.2 The governance structure of the Hellenic cybersecurity 
approach 
According to the content of Greece’s cybersecurity strategy, the centralized independent 
governance structure has been selected for assigning both roles of National Competent 
Authority (NCA)369 and Single Point of Contact (SPOC) to the National Cyber Security 
Authority - General Secretariat of Digital Policy (GSDP). 
Additionally, the National Authority Against Electronic Attacks - National Cert of the 
National Intelligence Service (EYP) has been designated as the responsible authority for 
the handling of risks and incidents based on a precisely defined procedure370. Table 30 
illustrates this governance structure. 
                                                 
367 Presidential Degree of 82/2017. 
368 On March of 2018. 
369 For both DSPS and OES. 
370 It is worth mentioning that on the 12th of November 2018 the Greek draft law for the transposition of 
the NISD into Greek law by rearranging this role to the Cyber-defense Directorate of the Ministry of De-
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Table 30: The governance structure of the Hellenic cyber-security approach 
NCA GSDP Representative in Coop-Group 
NATIONAL 
CSIRT 
National Cert Representative in CSIRT network 
 
4.2.2.1 Involved entities371  
The involved entities with the HCSS are coming from both of authorized and regulatory 
communities. 
A. Authorized entities 
The cybersecurity activities in Greece require the participation and cooperation of sev-
eral ministries. The following authorized entities are designated for serving the minis-
tries’ individual actions and concerns: 
1. Center for Safety Studies372 (CSS); 
2. National Intelligence Services (EYP), Technical Department INFOSEC; 
3. Cyber-defense Directorate 373;  
4. Computer Development Authority 374  
5. Cyber Crime Division 375  
6. Hellenic Police 376 
 
B. Regulatory bodies 
Additional regulatory authorities have been established for various CI such as:  
1. Regulatory Authority for Energy (RΑΕ); 
2. Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy 
 3. Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
4. Hellenic Telecommunications & Post Commission - EETT  
5. Stakeholders from the Transport sector: 
                                                                                                                                               
fense. Available at: https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/law-news/ste-boule-skhedio-nomou-gia-ten-
kubernoasphaleia.html 
371 As it is required in 3.1 State’s obligation under the NCSS. 
372 It was created so as to identify the Critical Infrastructures of Greece (abbreviation in Greek:ΚΕΜΕΑ) 
373 Ministry of Defense. 
374 Ministry of Administrative Reform and eGovernment. 
375 Ministry of Citizen Protection. 
376 Ministry of Citizen Protection. 
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 Regulatory Authority for Railways; 
 National Regulatory Authority for Land Transport; 
 Regulatory Authority for ports; 
 Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority377 (HCAA); 
 Air navigation supervising authority (ANSA). 
 
4.3 Evaluation of the HCSS 
1. Greece until today has not transposed the NIS Directive into the national legisla-
tion; however recently Greece took a step forward, by forwarding the relevant 
draft law in the Greek Parliament378.  Greece has integrated essentially but not 
formally the transposition of NIS Directive into national legislation by designat-
ing the roles and responsibilities of relevant entities complemented by identify-
ing the CI sectors and defining incident handling procedures and binding penalty 
rules. But these requirements should have been addressed by 9 November 
2018379. 
2. The protection of Critical Infrastructures in our country is far from the desira-
ble level; although Greece has formally incorporated the relevant European Di-
rective (114/2008 / EC) on the identification and designation of European criti-
cal infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection in-
to its legislation, subsequently now after 10 years, there is a mandatory account-
ability that must be applied avoiding be mistaken with the emphasis given on the 
funded programmes in the past.  
3. Additionally, the content of HCSS applies to networks and information sys-
tems within the whole public sector and not being implemented in fragmented areas. 
However, the absence of explicit references to critical infrastructure protection is-
sues resulting in not demonstrating the positive dynamic that should have. The ef-
                                                 
377 Hellenic Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks. 
378 https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/law-news/ste-boule-skhedio-nomou-gia-ten-kubernoasphaleia.html 
379 Maglaras/Drivas/Noou/Rallis, NIS directive: The case of Greece, ICST Trans. Security Safety 4(14), 
2018, p. 3. 
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fective cooperation between the public and private sector is fundamental for the 
recognition and protection of critical ICT infrastructures and related services380. 
4. Although in the HCSS there is a specific reference to cultural interests, cultur-
al interests are not explicitly included among the tasks381 of Department of infor-
mation security and networks (4.1.2.1). This is crucial because the National Compe-
tent Authority (GSDP) lacks the dynamism it should have in accordance with the 
NIS Directives requirements for achieving a coherent approach and for that reason a 
redefinition of its responsibilities is required. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
1. Cybersecurity is not a concern that we can avoid or ignore any more and the 
cyber threat is integrated into security conception.  
2. Although a lot of financial resources can be made available to tackle cyber-
security at the national level the lack of an appropriate coordination and compe-
tence between organizations is of paramount importance. 
3. Cybersecurity initiatives should not be limited to economically advanced coun-
tries. Instead, it is necessary to be addressed as a key priority ensuring the sup-
port of allied countries within EU. 
4. Each Member State will decide on which CI sector, from both of public and pri-
vate sector, the NIS Directive will be implemented on. 
5. The spread of internet use, which includes the use of networks and information 
systems alongside our day-to-day activities offers us an absolute freedom of ac-
                                                 
380 According to analysis and research institute “Dianeosis” study on “Holistic Critical Protection Infra-
structure”, pp. 119-120. Available at:  https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/infrastucture_paradoteo3_version_020616_2.pdf 
381 Άρθρο 160 Aρμοδιότητες της Γενικής Γραμματείας Ψηφιακής Πολιτικής, ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙ∆Α TΗΣ 
ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΕΩΣ Τεύχος Α’ 94/27.05.2016. available at: 
http://mindigital.gr/attachments/article/1109/N_4389_2016_%CE%93%CE%93%CE%A8%CE%A0.pdf 
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cess, but it can also put us with the involved information systems at very high 
risk unless we introduce the required prevention and protection rules. 
6. Network security demands a collective effort, at the local level, between all parts 
of an organization and the creation of strong cooperation between private and 
public bodies while building trust on them. 
7. The mistaken perception that security was synonymous with the choice of spe-
cific technology solutions382, does not exist anymore. Instead, the new security 
conception requires security to be provided by design. 
8. The NISD identifies the need for a cyber-security capability model to focus on 
the entire organization and in the particular domains of: 
 Risk Management; 
 Asset, Change, and Configuration Management; 
 Identity and Access Management; 
 Threat and Vulnerability Management; 
 Situational Awareness; 
 Information Sharing and Communications; 
 Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations; 
 Supply Chain and External Dependencies Management; 
 Workforce Management; 
 Cybersecurity Program Management. 
 
In that sense, NIS Directive regulates the creation of baseline security rules concerning 
network and information systems used from the public and private sector stakeholders 
while setting up requirements for education, awareness383 and training programs for in-
volved entities.  
The cybersecurity capability maturity model that satisfies the NISD requirements is the 
C2M2 model, which is updated and focused on the entire organization, while imple-
ments a certain risk management measurement system. In table 31 are depicted the se-
curity domains and objectives of the C2M2 model. 
                                                 
382 E.g. the best firewall. 
383 Both on a member-state level and an organizational level. 
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Table 31: Domains and objectives of the C2M2 model384. 
 
                                                 
384 Angel Marcelo Rea-Guaman, Tomás San Feliu, Jose A. Calvo-Manzano and Isaac Daniel Sanchez-
Garcia, Comparative Study of Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models, p. 9. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jose_Calvo-
Manza-
no/publication/319640924_Comparative_Study_of_Cybersecurity_Capability_Maturity_Models/links/5a
0d707da6fdcc39e9bfe110/Comparative-Study-of-Cybersecurity-Capability-Maturity-
Models.pdf?origin=publication_detail 
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6 An example of the NIS Di-
rective’s implementation into 
Aviation subsector in Greece 
6.1 Introduction 
In sections 6 and 7 (recommendations on developing an aviation cybersecurity strategy) 
I will present the possible way the NIS Directive could be implemented in the aviation 
subsector. The content of this presentation is based on the method proposed by ENI-
SA385and a study conducted by a research and analysis company ‘Dianeosis’, for identi-
fying the Critical Infrastructures386 in Greece. While advising the         aviation 
cybersecurity strategy of UK, for understanding which recommendations should be pro-
posed to Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority for implementing the NIS Directive’s re-
quirements into air transport subsector. 
The quantity of the information collected and processed was based on publicly accessi-
ble rights and personal expertise due to my participation in a relative training course387 
and the quality is ensured by appropriate scientific methods used from ENISA, 
‘DIANEOSIS’ and information sources provided by EUROCONTROL and Hellenic 
Civil Aviation Authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
385 Rossella Mattioli, 2014. 
386 Public and private. 
387 The cyber security in ATM, by EUROCONTROL. 
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6.2  Transport sector 
The transport sector provides services in many areas and supports relative economic ac-
tivities, such as trade, tourism, farming, and industrial development.  
The provided services are subdivided into sectors as depicted in table 32. 
Table32: The transport sector in Greece. 
TRANSPORT SECTOR 
Rail transport 
sector 
Road transport 
sector 
Shipping 
transport sector 
Air transport sector 
 
6.2.1 The case of Air transport sector services  
 
When we refer to air transport sector the following services are included: 
 Airport services; 
 Aeronautical services. 
 
6.2.1.1 Airport services 
The airport services include services related to air transport (including aircraft) and air-
port infrastructures. Table 33 presents schematically the airport services. 
Table 33: Airport services. 
Airport services 
Air-transport services 
(including aircraft services) 
Airport infrastructures 
Services 
 
The Air transport services are critical for Greece due to its geographical location and its 
soil morphology; in the meantime, operate 41 airports (picture 11) in Greece. 
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Picture 11: Airport network in Greece388. 
Despite the increased demand for air travel, the lack of significant investment in infra-
structure limits the development of the air traffic management system in Greece, which 
in its turn makes the risk of saturation evident. 
As a response to the increased demand on air travelling, the European Commission 
adopted the Single European Sky, in 2008, in order to create a legislative framework for 
European aviation for improving the quality of the civil aviation in terms of ensuring 
the provision of safer, more efficient and more environmentally friendly services389.  
It is worth mentioning that, "El. Venizelos'390,  was founded at the 30th position of the 
top 30 airports in Europe, with the second highest growth rate,  
by welcoming a total of 18,073,940 travellers in 2015 in the medium-sized airport's cat-
egory391. An additional discrimination concerns the airport of Santorini392  with the fast-
                                                 
388 Provided by Civil Aviation Authority, available at: http://www.ypa.gr/our-airports 
389 It is estimated that Air Passengers will be increased by 50% within EU by 2020 while the cargo ser-
vices by 125%. 
390 Athens airport 
391 The airports that receive 10-25 million passengers per year. 
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est growing one since it recorded an impressive 87.6% increase in passenger numbers 
for 2015393. 
Indicatively, the following table in tables 34 and 35 depict the increase in the movement 
of the air passenger community during 1996-2017394. 
Table 34: Domestic passenger traffic for 1996-2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
392 It belongs to category 4, which receives less than 5 million passengers per year. 
393 According to the ACΙ-European Airport Trade Association communication. 
394 Available at:  http://www.ypa.gr/profile/statistics/yearstatistics/ 
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Table 35: Scheduled International passenger traffic for 1996-2017. 
 
 
 
6.2.1.2 Aeronautical services  
The aeronautical services include the Air Traffic Management (ATM) services and the 
Airspace services (table 36). 
Table 36: Aeronautical services. 
Aeronautical services 
ATM services Airspace services (AIS) 
 
 
6.2.1.3 Air transport sector interdependencies. 
The CI of the air transport sector, through the networks and information systems that are 
used for providing their critical services, create dependencies on a variety of ICT sys-
tems and services. 
In table 37 I have included the identified interdependencies and the main providers of 
air transport sector services. 
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Table 37: Air transport services and identified interdependencies 
 
CI 
 
Relative 
sub-sector 
 
Interdependences  
Main providers 
Dependency on Affects 
Airport ser-
vices 
 
 
-Airport395 infra-
structures 
-Air transport – 
airline network 
(including aircraft 
services) 
 
-Energy supply; 
-ICT systems;  
-internet provision; 
-Interoperability of 
infrastructures; 
- X-Ray scanners;  
-Metal detectors;  
-flight management 
system;  
-CCTV396 system 
etc 
-Meteo services 
 
-Air transport 
sector  
-Tourist 
& Economic 
development 
 
-HCAA397 
-AIA398 
-FRAPORT399 
 
Aeronautical 
services 
-ATM services 
-AIS400 services (flight 
plan, NOTAM401 etc.) 
-Energy supply; 
-Air navigation 
systems402 (COM-
NAV-RADAR sys-
tem) 
All sectors403.  
Indicatively 
mentioning:  
-Tourism 
-Trade 
-HCAA 
-ICAO404 
                                                 
395 National, international, municipal or private airports. 
396 Closed-circuit television system. 
397 Hellenic civil aviation authority  
398 Athens international airport 
399 More information available at: https://www.fraport-greece.com/www.mjt-airport.gr 
400 Aeronautical information services supported by international civil aviation organization (ICAO) for 
ensuring the flow of information necessary for the safety, regularity, and efficiency of international air 
navigation. 
401 A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) in order to notify aircraft pilots of any potential hazards along a flight 
route or at a location that could affect the safety of the flight. 
402 The air navigation systems include the ICT systems used for communicating the aircraft to ground and 
the opposite, such as: Communication systems with transponders and receivers, Air navigation systems 
(ILS, VOR, DME) and radar system (air traffic control and navigation, and space and range instrumenta-
tion radar system). 
403 According to “Dianeosis” study, available at: page 117. 
404 International civil aviation authority 
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-ICT infrastructure; 
- Interoperability 
of infrastructures; 
-Meteo services 
-Aircraft ICT in-
frastructure.  
-Industry 
-Public admin-
istrations 
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7 Recommendations on estab-
lishing an Aviation cyberse-
curity strategy.  
7.1 Introduction  
The Aviation subsector (air transport sector) is responsible for developing an Aviation 
cybersecurity strategy for ensuring that it remains safe, secure and resilient into possible 
cyber threats due to the increasingly interconnected digital infrastructures. 
The Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA) is the competent authority under the 
Ministry of Infrastructures and Transport with the responsibility to design, develop, 
monitor, and maintain a National aviation cybersecurity strategy for air transport sector 
services. Although a national aviation security strategy has been developed in 2016, for 
ensuring the proper operation of the sector, providing protection against certain defined 
risks, such as physical threats, terrorist attacks, mechanical failures and human errors, 
the cybersecurity risk is a new entry into the security area. Taking into consideration 
that in modern times, the operation of the aviation sector relies heavily on complex and 
networked information systems, there is a need for developing a new security approach 
including the cybersecurity threats and impacts on aviation sector due to the existing 
dependencies between cyber, physical and personnel security conception. The content 
of this strategy is set up in a way that involved parties from government, regulators and 
aviation industry, tackle in order to ensure a robust approach to risk management.  
7.2 Scope 
The aviation cybersecurity strategy applies to the whole Greek aviation sector and in-
cludes: 
 Airports, including operators of passenger and cargo services and manufacturers 
and other ancillary service providers (airport infrastructures and facilities); 
 Air navigation service providers;   
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Although the airlines and airports have robust systems in place in order to protect their 
services against common hacking threats, there is a need for implementing a rather ho-
listic approach than a fragmented used till recently, by forcing them and IT providers to 
work towards a common security framework. 
Additionally, the ATM systems used are closed and mainly consisted of proprietary sys-
tems well-isolated from cyber-attacks. However, there are factors that may increase the 
possibility of being compromised by cyber-attacks, such as405: 
 Increasing automation and dependence on digital systems;  
 Growing need for interoperability for facilitating the ground to air communica-
tion;  
 Moving to a network-centric architecture;  
 Increasing use of COTS406 products and open standards;  
 Mixing legacy and modern equipment;  
 Adding more and more new end users; and   
 Increasing the capabilities of threat actors.  
 
Taking into consideration the increased interconnectivity between ATM systems along-
side the shared used of COTS products it is common knowledge that the Member States 
and operators will be more reliant on each other regarding their cyber protection. For 
example, an attack on a week point in the network before propagating across it may lead 
to cascade failures. In that case, security concerns should be placed on ensuring trust 
and assurance between operators of ATM systems. 
Therefore, the Aviation cybersecurity strategy provides guidance to secure the follow-
ing sectors:  
 Air Traffic Management (ATM) interface systems and aircraft: includes 
threats aimed at ATM system directly (such as attacks on ATM assets) or to oth-
er parts of the aviation system where ATM plays a key role in the prevention or 
response to such threats. 
 Airport systems: includes threats aimed at airport infrastructures directly. 
                                                 
405 Based on a position paper by ICB (Industry Consultation Body): “ Regulatory Response to ATM 
Cyber-Security”, p. 2. 
406 Commercial off the shelf products 
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 Airspace: includes threats related to unauthorized use, intrusion, illegal activi-
ties. 
 Other aircraft systems: include threats that compromise potential vulnerabili-
ties of used SCADA and ICT products in the aircraft's communication and enter-
tainment systems. 
In picture 12 is illustrated accordingly the ATM security conception with regards to 
general aviation security approach. 
 
 
Picture 12: The Aviation security and its components under the ATM conception407. 
 
7.3 Objectives 
The aviation cybersecurity strategy aims to: 
 Understand: 
i. the risks posed by cyber threats to the aviation industry infrastruc-
tures; 
ii. their vulnerabilities and  
iii. their potential impacts. 
 Manage cyber risks and take appropriate and proportionate actions to protect 
key assets; 
 Respond to and recover from cyber events and incidents effectively and 
                                                 
407 Provided by EUROCONTROL. 
  -125- 
ensure that lessons are learnt; 
 Promote cultural change, raise awareness and build cyber capability in the sec-
tor. 
7.4 Principles 
The development of the aviation cybersecurity strategy must be aligned with: 
 the Hellenic Cyber Security Strategy and  
 the Hellenic Aviation Security Strategy408. 
The aviation cyber-security strategy must be also focused on ensuring the following 
priorities for:  
a) Helping the aviation industry to operate for its customers; 
b) Ensuring a safe and secure way of travelling; 
c) Building a global and connected Greece; 
d) Encouraging competitive markets; 
e) Supporting growth while tackling environmental impacts; and  
f) Developing innovation, technology and skills. 
7.5 Strategic Context 
7.5.1 Definitions 
Clear definitions should be provided for establishing a common language within 
relevant stakeholders.  
7.5.1.1 Definitions for: 
 cyber threats into Greece and in alignment with the HCSS; 
 cyber threats into civil aviation; 
 cybersecurity into civil aviation for protecting the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of digital infrastructures and services; 
 cyber resilience into civil aviation for ensuring the recovery of digital infra-
structures and services to normal operation following a cyber-attack, taking 
                                                 
408 Αριθ. Δ15/Α/18070/1501 Εθνικός Κανονισμός Ασφάλειας Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας. 
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into consideration that there is a significant possibility that a cyber-attack 
cannot be prevented. 
 
7.5.1.2 Identification of threat sources, such as: 
 Risk of espionage; 
 Terrorism;  
 Criminals; 
 Extreme activists / Hacktivists; 
 Disgruntled staff. 
 
7.5.1.3 Identification of Actors source by using physical and/or electronic means, such 
as: 
 Outsiders 
 Insiders 
 Insiders in collusion with outsiders 
7.5.1.4 Identification of vulnerabilities 
 
7.5.1.5 Identification of impacts by setting up the appropriate criteria needed to be tak-
en into consideration for determining the types of significant impacts, such as: 
 loss of life; 
 disruption of aviation services; and 
 reputation damage. 
7.5.2 International Context 
The Cybersecurity Strategy for the European Union alongside the EU Cyber Defense 
policy framework409 set up the baseline for informing a regulatory framework to air 
transport sector operators and services. More specifically, Annex 17 from ICAO (chap-
ter 4) adopts a holistic approach to cyber-security and recommends the Member States 
to develop functions to protect systems used for civil aviation purposes from interfer-
ence that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation, as well as implement procedures to 
share threat information.  
 
                                                 
409 European Commission (2014) EU Cyber Defense Policy Framework.  
  -127- 
The ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973) assists in Annex 17 implementation 
and has been revised to contain minimum measures to protect critical information sys-
tems.  
Additional to ICAO, it should be defined all the organizations at European and interna-
tional levels each of which has a role to play in shaping the global approach to cyber-
security issue, such as: 
 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); 
 The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC); and 
 The European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). 
 
 
 
Picture: Aviation cyber-security affected entities410. 
7.5.3 Emerging Technologies 
Special interest should be focused on emerging technologies for ensuring that cyber re-
silience of innovations will be provided by their conception411 in the future. For exam-
ple, the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) since they are increasingly used in improving 
and delivering our everyday life. 
                                                 
410 Provided by: Mona Achkar Jabbour presentation at ICAO/UNOOSA Symposium, 2017 for Cyb-Air 
Security in Civil Aviation, p. 7,. Available at: 
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/workshops/2017/ICAOUNOOSA2017/0503_AL-
Achkar_Jabbour_Lebanese_Univ_rev.pdf  
411 Security by design. 
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7.6 Roles and Responsibilities 
A holistic approach should be taken by examining dependencies between cybersecurity, 
physical security and personnel security dependencies. 
The key roles of each of the partners in delivering aviation security are presented sche-
matically in picture 13. 
 
Picture 13: Key partners participating in aviation cyber-security strategy412. 
7.6.1 Government 
The Ministry of Infrastructures and Transport is responsible for developing the strategic 
objectives of aviation cyber-security strategy and regulation in Greek air transport sec-
                                                 
412 Provided by: The UK aviation cyber-security strategy, from Department for Transport, p.13. 
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tor, based on a robust assessment of the identified threats and vulnerabilities from para-
graph 7.5.1 
The Ministry of Infrastructures and Transport is also responsible for setting up the base-
line security measures for Critical National Infrastructure in the transport sector, which 
ensures their appropriate and proportionate protection against potential cyber-attacks. 
The government’s tasks are performed through the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority 
(HCAA) for providing advice, guidance and regulation to help operators and owners to 
mitigate the risks on assets, facilities, and ICT systems, platforms, networks, processes 
and people largely owned and managed.  
7.6.2 The GSDP 
The role of the GSDP in this strategy is defined in alignment to the HCSS since it re-
flects the single, central body for cybersecurity at a national level. The involved entities 
additional to the ministry of Infrastructure and Transport while being under the GSDP’s 
side are the following: 
 The ministry of foreign affairs in the context of the exchange of information 
between the Member States. 
 The HNDGS Chief; 
 The ministry of citizen protection;  
 EYP (the technical department-INFOSEC) as considered the national CERT. 
 
7.6.3 The Center for Safety Studies (KEMEA) 
KEMEA is appointed as the “National Contact Point” for the protection of European 
Critical infrastructures (ECIs)413 with the responsibility to provide protective security 
advice relating to national security threats in the physical and personnel/people security 
areas.  
                                                 
413 Following the implementation of the 2008/114/EC Directive of the European Council of December 8th 
2008 “regarding the definition and designation of the European Critical infrastructures and the assessment 
of the need to improve the protection of such infrastructures”. 
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7.7 Regulators 
7.7.1 The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
The CAA is responsible for the regulation of aviation security in Greece and monitors 
the aviation industry’s compliance with the aviation security requirements by  
determining safety and security strategy for the use of airspace. 
7.7.2 The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) of HCAA 
The role of the ICO is to provide communication to the public interest of security inci-
dents, which are applied under the GDPR regulation regarding the protection of person-
al data. 
7.8 The Aviation Industry 
The Greek Aviation Industry includes: 
 The airport services (air transport services and airport infrastructures); and  
 The aeronautical services. 
The key aviation authorities for state and non-state airports are the following: 
 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); 
 Athens International Airport (AIA); 
 FRAPORT: the responsible authority for the 14 Greek airports depicted in pic-
ture 14; 
 Hellenic Police Department; 
 Customs; and 
 Airline representatives. 
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Picture 14: The 14 airports of Greece under the FRAPORT’s authority414. 
 
Each key partner (government and regulators performs the strategic part and aviation 
industry performs the operational part) must define what they aim to deliver and when, 
in accordance with the objectives of the aviation cybersecurity strategy, defined in para-
graph 7.2. 
7.9 ACTIONS 
Each of the strategic partner (government-regulator-aviation industry) should define 
their goals and in accordance with the aviation cyber-security strategy’s objectives from 
paragraph 7.2. Additionally, an activity framework should be provided for determining 
the way each of the strategic partners’ defined goals will be fulfilled.  
                                                 
414 https://www.fraport-greece.com/uploads/page_art/0/34//fraport_entypo%20A4_GR.pdf p. 8 
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7.9.1 1st security objective: UNDERSTAND. 
The activity framework for enabling the 1st security objective includes security 
measures concerning: 
i. the risks posed by cyber-threats to the air transport sector;  
ii. the vulnerabilities within the transport sector; and  
iii. the potential impacts of these identified cyber-risks and vulnerabilities 
within the air transport sector. 
7.9.1.1 Required outcome 
The provision of a mature understanding between and within government, the regulators 
and the aviation industry by matching specific vulnerabilities in Critical National Infra-
structure sites and other critical assets, with common vulnerabilities across the air 
transport sector. 
 
7.9.1.2 Actions for government partner 
The government’s side will deliver: 
1. A continuous risk assessment process for identifying all the Critical National 
Infrastructure sites of air transport sector and all defined critical assets, in-
cluding data and information systems; 
2. A documented report for providing evidence on the founding of the risk as-
sessment process, including common vulnerabilities and the way these can 
be mitigated. 
 
7.9.1.3 The Greek aviation industry partner 
 The Greek Aviation Industry will: 
1. Prepare and maintain a list of all their critical digital, IT and Operational Tech-
nology systems, and platforms within their organization and supply chain, help-
ing them have a clear understanding of why these assets are considered critical 
to their provided services and how they can be affected by potential compro-
mised vulnerabilities. 
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7.9.1.4 Security measure- Risk Assessment 
The aviation industry must implement a scientific Risk Assessment method for identify-
ing the critical assets that need protection against cyber threats, physical risks and per-
sonnel harmful activities in order to assess whether the achieved or perceived risk is ac-
ceptable or tolerable; otherwise appropriate and proportionate preventive security 
measures should be adopted. 
The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) used for the aviation industry is 
based on Annex 17 from International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)415 
7.9.2 2nd security objective: MANAGE. 
The activity framework for enabling the 2nd security objective includes: 
i. Taking appropriate and proportionate security measures for protecting 
key assets; 
ii. Selecting security measures for continuously managing the cyber risks  
The security mechanisms that should be implemented by the aviation industry for satis-
fying the security objectives and requirements of national aviation cyber-security strate-
gy are based on the security manual Doc. 8973 of Annex 17 from ICAO. Particularly 
for ATM security the security manual Doc 9985 should be implemented (pictures 15 
and 16). 
  
                                                 
415 The ICAO Council adopts standards and recommended practices concerning air navigation, its infra-
structure, flight inspection, prevention of unlawful interference, and facilitation of border-crossing proce-
dures for international civil aviation. ICAO defines the protocols for air accident investigation followed 
by transport safety authorities in countries signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation. 
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Picture 15: Doc 8973 Aviation security manual416.  
 
Picture 16: Doc 9985- ATM security manual417. 
 
Table 38 provides security measures alongside the roles and responsibilities for key 
partners. 
 
                                                 
416 Provided by: EUROCONTROL. 
417 Provided by: EUROCONTROL. 
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Table 38: security measures for continuously managing cyber risks 
Security 
requirement 
Security mechanism Implementation plan 
GOVERNMENT  AVIATION INDUSTRY 
Continuously 
managing  
cyber risks 
 
 Risk 
management 
 
 
-Targeted support and advice to 
the aviation industry on devel-
oping risk treatment plans; 
- National level cyber risk as-
sessment; 
-communication of the results  
through documented reports to 
Boards and aviation industry 
groups to raise 
awareness about the approach 
and specific activities industry 
can take to protect itself 
against specific threats, by un-
derstanding the potential cost to 
business 
in case of a cyber-attack or sys-
tem compromise; 
-comprehensive guidance on the 
implementation o NIS Directive 
within stakeholders of the 
aviation industry. 
- implement a Risk Man-
agement Method with the 
following features: 
 i. continuous identification 
and assessment of cyber 
risks; 
ii. vulnerabilities treatment  
iii.robust governance struc-
tures and risk ownership  
 
- Ensure that cyber risks are 
managed throughout the 
lifespan of any new and 
developing systems, plat-
forms and technologies. 
OUTCOME The support to the Aviation industry with 
advice and guidance for managing cyber-
risks effectively and efficiently. 
 
7.9.3 3rd security objective: RESPOND and RECOVER. 
The aviation industry should be sufficiently prepared to deal with security incidents and 
events the moment they do occur. For that purpose, it is essential that there is a clear 
procedure for reporting the security incidents with corresponding business recovery 
plans related to critical assets for ensuring the effective and on time handling of them 
while promoting that lessons are across the industry.  Therefore, the security require-
ments should include documented processes for: 
i. Reporting incidents;  
ii. Managing incidents; and  
iii. Sharing of information within the aviation industry. 
 
In table 39 are included the security measures- mechanisms for satisfying the above-
mentioned security requirements.  
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Table 39: Security measures for achieving the objective of responding to cyber-threats. 
Security   
requirement 
Security mecha-
nism 
Implementation plan by: 
GOVERNMENT AVIATION 
INDUSTRY 
Respond to and 
recover from 
security inci-
dents and events 
i. reporting inci-
dents; 
ii. managing inci-
dents; 
iii. sharing infor-
mation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-preparing a report for assessing 
aviation industry’s capability to 
respond to a cyber-attack, carried 
out repeatedly periodically to mon-
itor progress; 
- Clearly defined procedures for 
determining the types of reporting 
incident alongside the content of 
required data (name, time) 
-create a cyber-security infor-
mation platform for communi-
cating the vulnerabilities and les-
sons learnt through incident han-
dling procedures.  
- Develop cyber-exercises for gov., 
regulators and aviation industry; 
-create PPP418 for sharing infor-
mation and threat intelligence; 
- Support to the aviation industry in 
setting up aviation cyber security-
CSIRTs for each stakeholder and 
meetings for the purpose of infor-
mation exchange and sharing of 
best practice. 
 
- Develop, imple-
ment and review 
business continuity 
plans for recovering 
the sooner from a 
cyber-attack or sys-
tem failure; 
- Report incidents 
to CSIRT of CAA 
through defined 
channels as out-
lined in NIS Di-
rective. 
OUTCOME The establishment of an incident re-
sponse mechanism including clear lines 
of reporting and processes for imple-
menting lessons learned. 
 
 
                                                 
418 Public and private partnership 
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In case of ATM security area, the established reporting platform used for security inci-
dents caused by physical and terrorist threats (e-tokai.net, produced by Eurocontrol) 
should be enhanced by adding cybersecurity indicators in the list provided for selecting 
the type of security incident. 
Additionally, the platform should be extended in providing support and shared infor-
mation to all notifier personnel for communicating the vulnerabilities and lessons learnt 
through incident handling procedures. 
The following pictures illustrate the application used from Hellenic Civil Aviation for 
reporting security incidents related to physical and terrorist threats. 
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Picture 18: Example of the incident reporting platform419 
7.9.4 4th security objective: PROMOTE CULTURE 
It is essential for the Greek aviation industry to be capable of managing its risks. For 
that purpose, there is a need for establishing and maintaining an advance minimum 
common level of cyber-security skills and knowledge for the personnel, while training 
people entering the profession of a cyber-security specialist. 
In order to satisfy the promotion of cultural change, raising awareness and building 
cyber capability the aviation industry should adopt security measures for: 
i. Working collaboratively at an international level; and  
ii. Providing Skills, training and resources. 
In table 40 are included proposed security measures for satisfying the 4th security objec-
tive of the aviation cyber-security strategy. 
 
Table 40: Security measures for achieving the objective of promoting culture, raising awareness 
and building cyber-capability. 
Security   
requirement 
Security mechanism Implementation plan by: 
GOVERNMENT AVIATION 
INDUSTRY 
Promote cultur-
al change, raise 
awareness and 
build cyber 
capability. 
i. Working collaboratively 
at a global and European 
level. 
 
- will follow the ICAO’s 
Working 
Group initiatives on Threat 
and Risk defence; 
- will work alongside other 
partners to help develop 
global 
approaches to tackling cyber 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
419 Source: the UK aviation cyber-security strategy, annex D, page 31. 
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ii. Providing Skills, train-
ing and resources 
 
vulnerabilities, and will con-
tinue to press 
for ICAO leadership in this 
area; 
- will seek to support and 
input to an appropriate pan-
European 
forum for exchanging infor-
mation and incident response; 
- will continue to support the 
work of the ECAC Study 
Group on 
the Cyber Threat to Aviation, 
and help to update and main-
tain ECAC 
guidance to states on 
cybersecurity; 
- will continue to support and 
input to the development of 
appropriate and proportionate 
aviation cybersecurity stand-
ards for 
industry through EUROCAE. 
 
The NCSC Industry 100 se-
condments initiative which 
invites 
organizations of all sizes to 
work with the NCSC by em-
bedding staff 
into the organization to pro-
vide the industry with a 
greater understanding of 
the cybersecurity environ-
ment, and the NCSC with 
new perspectives 
and knowledge of different 
sectors; 
- Access to certified training 
and professional schemes 
through the 
GCHQ Certified Training 
(GCT) scheme3 and the 
NCSC Certified 
Professional (CCP) scheme4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- adopt clearly defined 
career development 
paths and further 
development opportuni-
ties for cybersecurity 
professionals in the civil 
aviation sector.  
-develop and provide 
regular education pro-
grammes in collabora-
tion with ENISA for 
ensuring the participa-
tion of all personnel for 
achieving a common 
security level in identi-
fying the risks posed in 
the aviation industry and 
responding effectively. 
This will grow both the 
pool of suitably quali-
fied and experienced 
cybersecurity personnel 
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in the sector, as well as 
raising existing person-
nel’s cybersecurity ca-
pability. 
-organize annually re-
fresh courses (e.g. by 
organizing on the job 
training exercises) based 
on reported cyber-
security incidents per 
stakeholder in the indus-
try for sharing 
knowledge between 
personnel; 
-communicate the miti-
gation treatment estab-
lished for all the signifi-
cant security incidents 
providing evidence that 
all personnel have been 
informed. 
OUTCOMES 1. Enhances Greece’s capability to 
shape the global evolution of cy-
berspace regarding the civil avia-
tion strengthening the principle of 
national defence and proliferating 
national economic interests. 
 
2. Building on self -security capabil-
ities by creating expertise to meet 
national needs and interests with-
in the aviation sector for over-
coming future threats and chal-
lenges. 
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